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This thesis explores the changing status and perceptions of modern technology 
in Science Fiction films. Drawing on recent Science Fiction films Cloverfield (2008), 
District 9 (2009), Inception (2010) and Source Code (2011), this thesis argues that 
these four films in particular express a different perception of ‘modern technology’ 
than other Science Fiction films such as Avatar (2010) or Alien (1979). Instead of 
presenting ‘modern technology’ as something other-worldly, fantastical and 
spectacular, these films seem to portray ‘modern technology’ as something that is 
quite common and little cause for excitement.  This thesis thus asks if this change in 
portrayal of ‘modern technology’ represents a diminishing of any anxiety regarding 
the perceived negative impact of ‘modern technology’ on the status of ‘reality’ or 
‘authenticity’.  
To do so, this thesis first establishes some definitions for the key terms in this 
thesis, namely ‘reality’, ‘actuality’, ‘virtuality’ and ‘modern technology’, and 
examines the way these concepts interact with each other. After a close examination 
of some of the critical literature on the topic, this chapter concludes that the key issue 
perceived to be at risk is not ‘actuality’, that which has a physical presence, but 
‘reality’, that which is seen to be true but which has no physical existence.     
After establishing that, the thesis goes into an in-depth analysis of the chosen 
primary texts, Cloverfield (2008), District 9 (2009), Inception (2010) and Source 
Code (2011). By examining the way the films engage with concepts or themes such as 
the home video aesthetic, the body, memory and history respectively, this thesis 
demonstrates how these films express an anxiety over the perceived damaging effects 
of modern technology on the status of ‘reality’. At the same time, this thesis also 
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reveals the way these films attempt to sidestep the issue of ‘modern technology’ and 
thus mitigate any anxiety over the perceived effects of ‘modern technology’ on 
‘reality’.  
In conclusion, this thesis argues that the crisis expressed by these films is not 
the crisis of ‘actuality’, but of ‘reality’. Despite the way these films seem to recognise 
that modern technology has become quite commonplace in the everyday life of the 
average human, an anxiety is still present regarding the perceived impact of modern 
technology on ‘reality’. The films, in turn, attempt to alleviate this anxiety by 
emphasising the politically-correct values of romance, of familial love, and other 
human relationships. Paradoxically, though the films attempt to reaffirm the centrality 
of the human through the film’s emphasis on intangible ‘human’ characteristics, 
thoughts and emotions, this unsatisfactory engagement with the issue of modern 







Introduction: Modern Technology and the Science Fiction Film 
In recent years, advances in technology have altered the way humans relate to it and 
the (perceived) consequences of it. These newer technologies, which I term ‘modern’ 
technology, include, but are not restricted to, the rapid development of technologies of 
communication, from radios to television, from telephones to email, and modern 
technologies of reproduction, which take the form of digital cinematic technology. 
These developments have taken place mainly in the twentieth century and have 
carried on into the twenty-first century, and have changed the way humans relate to 
each other, to the environment, to information, to art, to cinema and even to their own 
bodies. As such, the impact of these modern technologies has resulted in a torrent of 
critical theory about the changes that have resulted from them. Furthermore, this is a 
topic that is infinitely vast, for though the focus of my thesis is on film, the critical 
theories on technology and its impact are not restricted only to that. Martin Heidegger 
in “Question Concerning Technology”, for example, takes both a historical and 
philosophical approach to the question of technology and our relationship to it. 
Langdon Winner, on the other hand, in Autonomous Technology, approaches the 
problems of technology, not just from a philosophical perspective, but from a political 
one as well.  
I thus intend to contribute to this growing body of critical theory on the 
relationship between humans and modern technology. Specifically, I wish to discuss 
how this relationship is presented in film as films are often influenced, if only 
subconsciously, by all these various discourses. Hence, to start with, this particular 
chapter establishes, through a literature review of some of these theories, four 
preliminary points that help define the theoretical perspective of this thesis. Firstly, I 
posit that modern technology has developed at a disorientating speed in the twentieth 
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and twenty-first centuries and has resulted in a change in the way humans relate to 
and perceive the world around them. Secondly, I propose that due to these changes, an 
anxiety has been born where the question of ‘actuality’, ‘reality’ and ‘virtuality’ is at 
the heart of it. Thirdly, I postulate that the study of Science Fiction films is an 
excellent way of accessing the exact relationship between these various components. 
Fourthly, I choose four particular Science Fiction films to study, namely Cloverfield 
(2008), District 9 (2009), Inception (2010) and Source Code (2011), because they 
represent a change in the way the genre typically engages with the question of modern 
technology. Finally, through an exploration of the various academic writings on these 
four subjects, I propose that these four films express an anxiety over the status of 
‘reality’ and ‘authenticity’ in a world where the ‘virtual’ can be a near-perfect 
simulation of the ‘actual’ or ‘real’. This anxiety is one which they try to resolve 
through the displacement of it onto the perceived ‘stability’ of the ‘reality’ of 
humanity.         
Perhaps one of the most prominent writings on the subject of modern 
technology is “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” by Walter 
Benjamin. For Benjamin, Art has always had a rather special place in human life 
because traditionally, art has been perceived as “unique and could not be 
mechanically reproduced” (Benjamin 218). Even though in theory, a work of art can 
be reproduced by the students of a master artisan or by third parties who wish to 
capitalise on the piece of art, in theory, the reproduction would not be identical to the 
original (Benjamin 218). Furthermore, even if the reproduction is done perfectly, it 
still lacked one element that the original had, “its presence in time and space, its 
unique existence at the place where it happens to be” (Benjamin 220). For example, 
chemical analyses can prove that a work of art came from a particular time period, 
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and this presence in that time is essential for the authenticity of the art (Benjamin 
220). Art thus has an ‘aura’ around it, a distance that is based on its authenticity, “the 
essence of all that is transmissible from its beginning, ranging from its substrantive 
duration to its testimony to the history which it has experienced” (Benjamin 221).  
For Benjamin, the mechanical age is one that has witnessed the withering of 
the ‘aura’ (221). The work of art, as he notes, has always been reproducible, but with 
modern technologies, the reproduction of art represents something new (Benjamin 
218). One of the ways in which it differed was that “the work of art reproduced 
becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility” (Benjamin 224). Using the 
example of photographic negatives to make his point, Benjamin describes how a 
“negative… can make any number of prints; to ask for the “authentic” print makes no 
sense” (224). This can be opposed to how a master artist’s original painting is 
considered ‘authentic’, compared to the copies made by his apprentices. Furthermore, 
in discussing film, he describes how it differs from theatre in that while in the theatre 
“one is well aware of the place from which the play cannot immediately be detected 
as illusionary” (Benjamin 233), a filming in the studio gives the illusion of 
“equipment-free aspect of reality” (Benjamin 233). In short, for Benjamin, the 
authenticity of art has been called into question, and because of this, the human sense 
perceives art in a very different way than it used to.  
Another prominent theorist who more recently discusses the impact of modern 
technology is Telotte in A Distant Technology. In the introduction to this book, 
Telotte examines the Machine Age, a period of time which he defines as stretching 
“roughly from the time of World War I to the start of World War II” (1). For Telotte, 
this is the period where “the modern world first discovers its specifically modern 
character” (1). It is also, Telotte argues, the point in which the world first established 
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the “emergence of a contemporary postmodern culture” (1), a culture that is partly the 
result of “the technology that seems to be constantly reshaping our world, reworking 
our culture, even modifying our very humanity” (1). More specifically, and with more 
relevance to my thesis, Telotte outlines some of the ways technological changes in the 
Machine Age transformed the ways films were made. For example, Telotte describes 
how technology significantly altered film’s form, with the development of sound 
recording, synchronisation, amplification, colour reproduction and other such 
technological changes (2). This, Telotte argues, resulted in a tension where film 
strived for a “new level of realistic representation, for what had been described as 
“transparent realism”, while struggling with its own technological development” (2). 
Like Benjamin, Telotte thus recognises that the development of modern technology 
has resulted in an increasingly large number of questions regarding the nature of 
‘reality’ and of ‘authenticity’.  
Furthermore, this is a change that clearly continues to happen even in recent 
years. Modern technology has continued to develop, with the emergence of new 
technologies like digital technologies, virtual reality and other such technologies, and 
these developments continue to shape and change our perceptions of things around us.  
For example, in the introduction to the book Virtual Globalization, David Holmes 
discusses how changes in technologies of communication have altered our sense of 
community (5). For Holmes, two of the most prominent agents of globalisation are 
telecommunications and tourism, which have changed the perception and creation of 
contemporary ‘world pictures’ (3). This is because these two agents are at the core of 
the process of movement, whether of human bodies or information, which is very 
characteristic of modernity (Holmes 3). By showing how the availability of access 
into virtual spaces of communication allows any individual access into the community 
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of the medium, one that must be accessed constantly for integration (Holmes 7), 
Holmes demonstrates how travel in the virtual space is essential for the individual to 
access a space through which constructions of place and cultures are increasingly 
formed and communicated (9-10). Hence, Holmes recognises how electronic spaces 
have started to take over physical spaces, and how the way people relate to each other 
has changed because of it. Holmes’s article also demonstrates a change in the 
perception of ‘actual’, physical spaces, ‘virtual’ spaces and the question of which is 
‘more’ authentic or ‘real’. This particular work is significant for my thesis, not only 
because it demonstrates how ‘modern technology’ continues to generate debate, but 
also how the question of ‘reality’, ‘actuality’ and ‘virtuality’ still remain prominent 
decades after Walter Benjamin wrote about it. 
With so much change taking place, it is inevitable that a certain degree of 
anxiety would be felt by those living through these times. This is recognised by the 
theorists mentioned thus far. For example, Holmes describes the increasing 
importance for an individual to stay attached to the virtual space (7). If an individual 
is distanced from the virtual space, such as when they are disconnected from the 
Internet, the individual experiences a sense of unease (Holmes 7). This unease is a 
symptom of the growing importance of electronic/virtual space as opposed to physical 
space. The community within these mediums and networks, and the desire for an 
individual to be within them has to be secured (Holmes 7). Similarly, Benjamin’s 
article raises the problems of technology when politics are made aesthetic (241). For 
Benjamin, the rendering of politics aesthetic results in the self-alienation of humanity 
(242). Though their approaches and understanding of the kind of anxiety generated 
differ, these theorists are in agreement that anxiety is one of the negative 
consequences of modern technology. 
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The anxiety about modern technology and its altering of perception, 
specifically the way modern technology has impacted film and the discourse of it is 
the topic of this thesis. Specifically, since ‘authenticity’ is at the heart of so much 
discourse on the impact of modern technology on society, the key issue here is about 
anxiety over authenticity as threatened by modern technology. One of the best ways to 
access this, I argue, is through the Science Fiction film. Bruce Franklin, for example, 
notes that though Science Fiction has forerunners that date back at least two thousand 
years, the genre as we recognise it now is fairly recent and is the “expression of 
modern technological, scientific, industrial society, appearing when pre-industrial 
societies are transformed by an industrial revolution (24). In short, the appearance of 
the industrial society with its trappings of modern technology is needed for the 
creation of the “consciousness characteristic of SF… [and] also the very means of 
physically propagating SF in its various cultural forms” (Franklin 24). As such, we 
can view these films as reactions, consequences or even signifiers of bigger 
discourses about modern technology and the anxiety over authenticity. 
Certainly, many theorists have endeavoured to demonstrate how science 
fiction films reflect, even engage, with the technological developments in the modern 
age and their impact on society. In “A Cinema of Spectacle” for example, Telotte 
discusses the cinema of spectacle in American Science Fiction films during the 
Machine Age. For Telotte, the Science Fiction film “extrapolates from the 
technological reality of the day, visualizes what has only been dreamt, images what 
might lie outside our world” (“Cinema of Spectacle” 98). It thus becomes significant 
for him that the “genre seems committed to spectacle” (Telotte “Cinema of Spectacle” 
98). Some films, Telotte notes, “became more a matter of spectacular context, that is, 
of a backdrop shaped by Machine Age styles or filled with various technological 
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icons” (“Cinema of Spectacle” 100). This is reflective of cinema trying to engage with 
the problem of modern technology, “trying by turns to explore the spectacular 
promise of technology, to embrace it, and to find some compromise with its 
implications” (Telotte “Cinema of Spectacle” 98). For Telotte, the implications of 
modern technology are cultural, found in an “increasing sense that our machine 
technology was contributing to a kind of dynamic anarchy, one that was ripping us 
away from our deep roots in an older, more stable Euro-centric culture” (“Cinema of 
Spectacle” 101). Linking this back to the previous discussion on anxiety over modern 
technology, the argument here is that the root cause of anxiety is the destabilisation of 
the ‘reality’ or ‘authenticity’ of culture by modern technology. 
This trend of Science Fiction films reflecting or engaging with the question of 
modern technology did not stop in the Machine Age. Brooks Landon in “Computers 
in Science Fiction” discusses the changing portrayal of computers in Science Fiction 
films. To make a brief summary of Landon’s observation, computers have moved 
from being characters in the literature or films (whether as villains or heroes) (89) to 
creators of narratives (86) to being part of the human body or to being virtual spaces 
(93). This reflects a changing relation between film, their producers and consumers, 
and modern technology. For example, Landon notes that in recent times, “computers 
are “disappearing” into the fabric of everyday life” (85). At the same time, “SF 
computers in recent stories are also blending into the technosphere” (85). 
Furthermore, “SF film[s]… not only present narratives in which computers 
prominently figure in the plot… but are also themselves increasingly produced by and 
used to showcase computer technology” (Landon 85). Simply put, Science Fiction 
films are used as a screen for reflecting popular attitudes and perceptions towards 
modern technology.  
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A further evolution of this argument can be seen in Brooks Landon’s “Future 
So Bright They Gotta Wear Shades”. In this article, Landon moves from discussing 
computers and the physical manifestation of technology in film to discussing the 
insidiousness of modern technology in everyday life. Through an analysis of the 
cyberpunk genre, Landon describes how it “is probably the first science fiction to take 
the cultural implications of technology completely seriously” (“Future So Bright” 
123). For cyberpunk science fiction, “electrical and medical technology now 
surrounds us, not as tools or toys, but as a new environment, an ecosystem that 
influences almost every aspect of our existence” (Landon “Future So Bright” 123). 
For the purposes of examining the implications raised by the genre, Landon analyses 
Neuromancer, which coined the word “cyberspace” (“Future So Bright” 120). As 
described by Landon, in Neuromancer, computer users can move into the cyberspace, 
which is a “simulated three-dimensional world rather than observing an image” 
(“Future So Bright” 121). This, Landon argues, challenges our sense of reality and our 
understanding of what it means to be human (“Future So Bright” 121). From this 
article, we see yet again that technology in Science Fiction films evolves alongside its 
real-life counterpart.    
At this point, it is necessary to stop and re-examine what has been established 
so far. In summary, I have, through the discussion of some of the academic literature, 
established three main points. First, I propose that modern technology has developed 
at an increasing speed in the last century, and has continued to do so in modern times. 
This rapid change has altered the way humans relate to each other and to modern 
technology as a whole. Second, I argue that because of these technological 
developments, an anxiety has resulted, the cause and effect of which is the discussion 
of much academic literature. Often, the question of ‘actuality’, ‘reality’ and 
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‘virtuality’ is an inherent part of this anxiety. Thirdly, I postulate that Science Fiction 
films are reflections of perceptions of modern technology, given how the genre itself 
is so closely tied to it such that it appears not just as key features in the films’ 
narratives but in the production of the film itself. Furthermore, as technology develops 
through time, so too does the way Science Fiction films engage with it. This last point 
is of particular importance because I propose now that there has been a further change 
in Science Fiction films in in the twenty-first century, and this is a change that reflects 
changing attitudes towards modern technology and its impact on everyday life.  
This change can be found in the four films that are the primary focus of this 
thesis. According to Brian Stableford in “Narrative Strategies in Science Fiction”, 
there are certain characteristics in Science Fiction films that, arguably, mark them as 
such. The key role technology plays in the films is one (Stableford 33). These include 
futuristic technologies such as spaceships and space travel, which have become iconic 
tropes in American Science Fiction (37-38). An excellent example of this is the Star 
Wars Trilogy, featuring Episodes IV to VI (1977-1983), which still remains popular 
even today, as seen by the launch of the prequel to the original Star Wars trilogy, 
featuring Episodes I to III. The popularity of the Star Wars franchise and blockbuster 
films like Avatar (2009) which feature inter-planetary travel and aliens, lend credence 
to the enduring status of spaceships and space travel in the genre. In contrast, the four 
films my thesis is based on, Cloverfield (2008), Inception (2010), District 9 (2009) 
and Source Code (2011), feature something quite different. Firstly, the films do not 
play up the idea that they had taken place in the ‘future’. For example, Cloverfield 
takes place in present day New York. Inception, though featuring ‘futuristic’ 
technology is set in places that are familiar to the audience, like a café in Paris or the 
insides of an airplane. Source Code too is set primarily in the space of a rather 
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ordinary-looking contemporary train, and District 9 takes place mostly in the rundown 
slums of South Africa, an image that would be familiar to anyone who has seen 
images of present day South Africa. Secondly, the images of modern technology in 
these films are not necessarily visually spectacular. In Cloverfield, the film adopts a 
home-video aesthetic which means that the monster attacking New York is seldom 
seen clearly. In both Inception and Source Code, which feature ‘futuristic’ 
technology, the machines themselves, are not always seen clearly on screen, or if they 
do, appear to be quite uninteresting. For Inception, dream-manipulation does produce 
spectacular images, but the technology that allows this takes the form of a small 
machine in a suitcase, hardly any cause for excitement and visual pleasure at all. In 
Source Code, though Colter, the protagonist of the film, repeatedly wakes up in a 
spaceship-like dome, its dark and dilapidated state does not allow the audience to see 
much detail at all. Even for District 9 which features aliens and spaceships, the 
technologies of the aliens are not the key plot of the film; the main protagonist 
Wikus’s discovery of his ‘human’ side, his empathy with the aliens and his love for 
his wife is. In these films, modern technologies appear as very ordinary aspects of 
everyday life and thus become secondary to the film’s plot. 
As can be seen, the films treat 'modern technology' as something that is given, 
that is everywhere, and that is both more commonplace and more insidious at the 
same time. Given the difference in attitude towards modern technology expressed by 
these films as compared to other films like Avatar for example, a closer examination 
of them is a necessary addition to the discourse of modern technology in Science 
Fiction films. The question I wish to examine is whether these films are truly as 
unconcerned and as comfortable with modern technology as they appear to be. Is 
there no longer any anxiety involved? In the following chapters, I demonstrate how 
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these films engage with the various discourses of film, body and virtual reality 
respectively. I prove that at the heart of each film is the question of ‘actuality’, 
‘reality’ and the ‘virtual’, and that an anxiety has been created by the destabilising of 
the ‘real’ in an age where modern technology can simulate it to near-perfection. 
Furthermore, I argue that the anxiety in these films is not so much about the virtual or 
the actual, and the privileging of the actual over the virtual. The anxiety in these films 
is about authenticity. To varying degrees, the films suggest that it does not matter 
whether an object is actual (has a physical body) or if it is virtual (has no physical 
body), but whether it is ‘real’ (somehow true or authentic). In order to reaffirm the 
real, the films suggest that ‘authenticity’ and ‘reality’ can still be found in the human, 
in the form of love (romantic or familial), or other human emotions, and in the human 
presence. However, by doing so, I argue that the films sidestep the issue of 
technology entirely to focus on the ‘human’, the emotional and the visceral. By 
reaffirming the centrality of humanity, the films still privilege ‘nature’ over 
‘technology’, even as they propose that the human is not necessarily bound to the 










Chapter One: The Problem with Virtuality: What is at Stake? 
Before I jump into an analysis of the films, it is worthwhile to define some of 
the key terms in my thesis, namely ‘virtual’, ‘real’, ‘actual’ and their relationship with 
‘modern technology’. This is for the purpose of elaborating on what I argue is the key 
anxiety present in the films chosen: the possibility of modern technology simulating a 
virtual world that is as ‘real’ as the ‘actual’ one. To begin, I shall start with a 
definition of the ‘actual’. What is ‘actual’ is what has a physical or material existence 
in this world (Kalaga 99). What is ‘real’ might then be thought of as what has an 
existence, physical or not, that is seen as true and absolute. More importantly, as 
Gaylard argues, “realism has been characterized… as the belief in the ability of signs 
to represent an objectively verifiable world accurately” (N.p.). As seen, a link is 
drawn between ‘actuality’ and ‘reality’ whereby the ‘actual’ appears to be more easily 
verifiable as ‘real’ than something that is only ‘real’. Next, it is important to clarify 
what I refer to with the term ‘modern technology’. ‘Modern’ technology is a very 
broad term that refers to technologies that Baudrillard links to the loss of the “image’s 
power of illusion” (8). These are the technologies of the media that are “super-tech, 
super-efficient, super-visual” (Baudrillard 8), which by creating increasingly realistic 
images exterminates the real (Baudrillard 9). Hence, in the following chapters, 
‘modern technology’ is used to refer to a number of things including hand-held 
cameras, CGI and digital technologies, because the term, in my thesis, does not refer 
specifically to a particular type of technology. Rather, it refers to a wide range of 
technologies that have been perceived to take part in the loss of this ‘illusion’. Giving 
the term such a broad definition also allows me to engage critically with a range of 
different types of technology, which demonstrates the extent to which the human 
existence is infiltrated by it. The ‘virtual’ I refer to is complicit in the extermination of 
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the ‘real’, and has connotations of falsity that place it quite superficially, as I 
demonstrate in later chapters, on the opposite end of ‘reality’ and ‘actuality’. As can 
be extracted from Baudrillard's writings on the ‘virtual’ and the ‘real’, the ‘virtual’ is 
often linked with “illusion” (9). When combined with modern technology, it is that 
which “tends towards the perfect illusion” (Baudrillard 9) and in doing so abolishes 
the illusion and eliminates the real (Baudrillard 9).        
The first thing to note about the definitions provided is that ‘reality’, 
‘virtuality’ and ‘actuality’ are not mutually exclusive, so it can be hard to differentiate 
between the three. Drawing on Deleuze’s theories of the virtual and actual, Wojciech 
Kalaga discusses the nature of virtuality and its relation to the actual (96). For 
example, when explaining the process of relations, Kalaga proposes that “if we retain 
the concept of existence for material, mind-independent beings, we may say that 
relations virtually subsist” (98). However, even though these relations are not actual, 
they are still considered real (Kalaga 98). From this, Kalaga then concludes that “the 
reality we are confronted with in everyday life and which we consider material is in 
fact hybrid: it involves both actuality (the material) and virtuality (the relational)” 
(99). For, even though the objects are material and actual, relations among them are 
virtual (Kalaga 99). In short, the actual, the virtual and the real do interact with each 
other on many levels, and cannot be separated from each other.  
Enter the factor of modern technology and something changes. In the same 
article, Kalaga writes that “In the world of technology, telepresence, synthetic 
environments, etc., the immediate… association of the virtual is with the concept of 
virtual reality” (96). However, he argues that this association is problematic as the 
virtual and the actual exist in many forms in the daily life of the human being, from 
diasporas to objects in a museum (96, 99-100). Since the virtual exists, even in our 
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everyday lives, why does it receive so much attention when it is associated with 
modern technologies of cyberspace and synthetic environments? What is it about the 
virtual as virtual ‘reality’ created by technology that receives so much critique?  
One of the places we can turn to is Science Fiction films, which have actively 
engaged with ideas of virtual space or reality. Perhaps one of the most prominent and 
well-known films to do that would be The Matrix (1999). Directed by Andy and Larry 
Wachowski, this 1999 Hollywood blockbuster is based in a world where humans exist 
only as living batteries harnessed by a race of sentient machines for their own 
purposes. Neo, played by Keanu Reeves, discovers through Morpheus, one of the few 
free humans, that the world he always thought of as ‘reality’ is nothing but a virtual 
world created by machines to keep humanity unaware of the fact that they only exist 
as resources for them. The actual world (also portrayed as the ‘real’ world, as opposed 
to the ‘fake’ world of the Matrix), as Neo discovers, is nothing but a barren wasteland. 
However, given the choice between returning to the Matrix or remaining in this ‘real’ 
world, Neo chooses to fight against the machine, engaging in visually stunning battles 
with Agents, sentient programs that exist only within the virtual reality created by the 
machine, the Matrix. Eventually, the movie ends with Neo being set up as a heroic 
freedom fighter who promises to free humanity from their enslavement to the 
machine. This film, and its sequels, The Matrix Reloaded (2003) and The Matrix 
Revolutions (2003), as seen, engage actively with issues of virtuality and reality. 
Interestingly enough, the film quite clearly privileges one over the other. Since Neo, 
the hero of the film, chooses to return to the actual world instead of staying within the 
constructed and virtual one, arguably, the spectator is directed by the film to privilege 
the actual (linked to the real) over the virtual (linked to the constructed). This 
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tendency to favour the real and actual is further emphasized by how the virtual is 
represented by the Agents, the violent, repressive and inhuman antagonists to Neo.          
Laura Bartlett and Thomas Byers in “Back to the Future: The Humanist 
Matrix” note that some postmodern theorists celebrate the “purported demise of the 
unitary, coherent humanist subject of the modern era… [and] welcome a radically 
new subjectivity – fragmented, fluid, and flexible” (28). This attitude is the result of a 
belief that “the postmodern reconfiguration breaks down or deconstructs the 
oppressive boundaries of (phal)-logocentricism – blurring the border between binary 
terms… thus posing a powerful threat to patriarchal capitalism” (Bartlett and Byers 
28). At the same time, Bartlett and Byers also recognise that postmodern subjectivity 
“bears uncanny similarities to the structures of global capitalism” (29), making it a lot 
less radical than some theorists claim.   
Though the authors do not provide any definite responses to these two schools 
of thought, they do examine the way The Matrix addresses these issues. They argue 
that though the film is a cinematic example of the cyberpunk genre with its noticeably 
postmodern style, the film repudiates the cyberpunk genre’s anti-humanist stance and 
tries to re-inscribe the nature/artifice binary that cyberpunk usually attempts to 
deconstruct (Barlett and Byers 29). For example, the battle between the human beings 
led by Neo and the machines is one over human subjectivity. Notably, the artificial 
intelligence prevails only because of its capacity to separate consciousness from the 
materiality of the body (Barlett and Byers 33). Hence, when subjectivity is configured 
as post-human, when it is divorced from the actuality of the body, it becomes 
vulnerable and open to attacks from machines and technology. In short, the film 
draws a very clear binary between actuality, embodied by the organic, human Neo, 
and the virtual, represented by artificial intelligence agents like Agent Smith. This 
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binary then corresponds to ‘virtual’ or ‘disembodied’ as ‘false’ and the ‘actual’ or 
‘human’ as ‘real’ (Barlett and Byers 30). The anxiety here is over the falsity of the 
virtual. The virtual is rejected because it is not authentic and thus not ‘real’.  
This concept is recognised and elaborated on in David Gunkel’s “The Virtual 
Dialectic”. In this article, Gunkel notes how the choice of the red pill or the blue pill 
offered to Neo by Morpheus is really a choice between the harsh truth of the ‘real’ 
world and the comfortable lie of the virtual world, the Matrix (194). Gunkel then 
moves on to analyse the “decision by which one chooses red and blue or rules them 
out” (195). First, Gunkel argues that Neo’s choice of reality, the barren wasteland, 
over the comfortable, modern world within the Matrix is not as daring as some critics 
claim it is (201). It is a decision that “conforms to and confirms one of the 
fundamental values of Western thought” (Gunkel 201). It is a choice that can be 
traced in the history of Western philosophy as far back as Plato’s “Allegory of the 
Cave” (Gunkel 199). Furthermore, his choice of reality is necessary because if he 
chooses the blue pill, he returns to the Matrix and the film cannot continue (Gunkel 
198). Gunkel then notes that Neo’s choice of the ‘real’ is the choice to become aware 
of what is and is not true (204). For, to choose the virtual is to remember nothing 
about reality, but to choose reality is to be able to manipulate the virtual world 
through the recognition that it is not ‘real’ and thus can be changed by his will 
(Gunkel 204). 
On the other hand, Gunkel argues that critics that advocate choosing virtuality 
fail to escape this fundamental philosophy, as most critics who advocate choosing the 
blue pill argue that to do so is simply choosing one ‘reality’ over another, each as 
‘real’ as the next (205). For example, Gunkel cites Weberman who argues that if life 
in the Matrix is more comfortable than in the real world then it makes more sense to 
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choose virtuality over reality (206). By saying this, critics like Weberman suggest that 
the comfort offered by the Matrix is as ‘real’ as the harshness of the ‘real’ world, thus 
there is no substantial difference between choosing the red pill or the blue pill 
(Gunkel 208). However, for Gunkel, these alternative readings on The Matrix do not 
invert the fundamental decision at the core of this choice (207). These challenges do 
not propose that falsity and deception are valued over truth; instead they suggest that 
as long as both worlds are as ‘real’ as each other, it does not matter which pill Neo 
chooses (Gunkel 208). Gunkel further critiques the choice of ‘truth’ or ‘deception’ as 
an artificial opposition set up so as to privilege one over the other (212). The choice 
itself is a false one as there is no real choice involved given that the decision between 
the pills is a mere performance completely circumscribed by the Matrix (Gunkel 212). 
It is thus necessary, Gunkel argues, to question the “structure, necessity, and stakes of 
this particular and limited set of alternatives” instead of simply choosing one or the 
other (213). As Gunkel notes, Neo could have chosen not to make a choice thus 
refusing to be restricted to the two options presented to him (213). To be truly 
revolutionary is thus not to choose ‘virtuality’ over ‘reality’, but to refuse to be 
restricted by a choice where one option is already privileged over the other (Gunkel 
213).    
What Gunkel’s article illustrates, and its value to my thesis, lies in his 
demonstration of how the ideas of ‘truth’, ‘reality’ or ‘authenticity’ hold very high 
and revered statuses in Western philosophy. Almost everyone, Gunkel argues, 
identifies with Neo’s choice of the ‘truth’ as the ‘correct’ one (198) due to its revered 
status. Hence, any decision that involves choosing between the ‘real’ or ‘actual’, and 
the ‘virtual’ is a foregone one to begin with. However, Gunkel’s review and critique 
of some critics who advocate taking the blue pill is also important in revealing a key 
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aspect of ‘reality’ that makes it a rather unstable one: that ‘reality’ does not 
necessarily have a physical existence.      
In the film, The Matrix, the binary in question is between the actual and the 
virtual. The two worlds contrasted are the Matrix, the virtual world that exists only as 
a simulation within the human brain, and the ‘actual’ world, one that has a physical 
presence which is highlighted, ironically, by the dilapidated, physically broken state 
of that world. More importantly, the anxiety present is also one of authenticity. As 
both articles have demonstrated, the reason why the harsh, barren actual world where 
the freed humans live is privileged over the comfortable, modern world of the Matrix, 
is because it is closely associated with key ideas of ‘truth’, ‘reality’ and ‘authenticity’. 
These ideas are, as both articles recognise, privileged in modern thought due to the 
long history of Western philosophy which has put these concepts on a pedestal. 
However, is it sufficient to then say that the anxiety expressed in this film is an 
anxiety of ‘actuality’? In other words, is ‘actuality’ the concept that is at stake in an 
encounter with the virtual?   
In the chapter “‘No Turning Back’: The Fetishization of Authenticity”, 
Timothy Bewes discusses the strange emphasis on ‘authenticity’ in the 1990s (50). 
The entire chapter is very long and to go through the whole chapter would be 
redundant for my purpose. Hence, I will only discuss three points Bewes raises with 
regards to sincerity, atomization and acceleration, which are most relevant to this 
thesis. To start with, one interesting point that Bewes raises, through the examples of 
the Enlightened Tobacco Company which insists on being ‘open’ about how their 
products kill and the McDonald’s hamburger chain which dropped its trademark 
‘Have a nice day’ in favour of greater staff spontaneity, is how there is a “perceptible 
urge towards nakedness and clarity, towards the purity of the thing itself rather than 
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its symbolic representation or its corrupt imitation” (51). This urge, Bewes argues, 
“constitutes a progressive and systematic mass cultural stripping-away of the aura 
from the object” (51). For, instead of the ‘aura’ that Walter Benjamin describes, a 
“cheap literality pervades these late-twentieth-century commodities, an air of 
transparency, of neutrality, of immediacy” (Bewes 52). If there is a “collective social 
anxiety around authenticity” (Bewes 51), this push towards purity could perhaps be 
seen as a way of dealing with the withering of the ‘aura’. 
Along with that, Bewes also sees an ‘atomization’ of humanity (52). On one 
hand, in the fields of biology, the study of the human genome seems to reveal the 
‘truth’ behind the mystery of the human body (Bewes 52-53). Along with this comes 
the anxiety concerning authenticity, a fear that scientists can ‘misuse’ their knowledge 
through genetic experiments on the human genone (Bewes 53). On the other hand, in 
the field of the humanities, this process of demystification takes the form of an 
attempt to “excise the symbolic, the metaphorical; to conceptualize subjectivity as 
mechanical, soulless, materialized” (Bewes 53-54). Quoting Baudrillard, Bewes 
suggests that there is a breakdown between the boundaries of the human and inhuman 
towards the “subhuman” (54). In other words, the constant search for the ‘truth’ has 
led to a reduction of the human being. 
At the same time, Bewes declares that “Life… is speeding up” (55). The 
fetishization of ever smaller particles and the ubiquitous anxieties concerning 
authenticity, Bewes argues, are symptoms of an accelerating culture (55). As “our 
representations attain an even higher degree of definition, so the signifier is 
increasingly taken to be the thing itself” (Bewes 55). “Consumption and enjoyment of 
the event… has replaced the cataclysmic event, that which appears manifestly on a 
stage of its own making” (Bewes 55). Another phenomenon associated with this 
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acceleration of culture, Bewes notes, is a hyper-density of information, one which 
includes the insistence on one’s ‘authenticity’ that also has a decelerating effect upon 
society (56). Due to this simultaneous accelerating and decelerating of culture, Bewes 
feels that culture “is approaching a general condition of polarity” (56). In reaction to 
this, Bewes notes, there have been many people who have attempted to ‘demonstrate 
authenticity’ (59). “However, the intention to demonstrate authenticity is implicated 
in the demonstration itself… Absolute authenticity necessitates one’s own extinction” 
(Bewes 59).  
From Bewes’s broad analysis of the privileging of authenticity in the 1990s, it 
becomes possible to narrow down the anxiety present between technology and 
concepts of actuality, reality and virtuality. Like The Matrix and its corresponding 
criticisms, Bewes recognises that technology has resulted in a kind of collective social 
anxiety. In his descriptions of ‘atomization’ and ‘acceleration’, advances in genetic 
studies and engineering, and the hyper-density of information caused by on-the-spot 
news reports of events, are both symptoms and causes of an anxiety over authenticity. 
The relationship between modern technology and anxiety is thus reaffirmed. 
However, the value that this chapter is the further recognition that ‘authenticity’, a 
subset of ‘reality’, is not necessarily tied to ‘actuality’. Take for instance the example 
Bewes raises about how McDonald’s dropped its trademark ‘Have a nice day’ (51). In 
this equation, the object with an actual, physical presence is the staff member in 
question. However, having the staff member be physically present is not enough to 
ensure ‘authenticity’ or ‘reality’. An intangible quality, ‘spontaneity’, is desired as an 
expression of ‘authenticity’. In that sense, unlike The Matrix where the ‘real’ is 
grounded in the ‘actual’, this chapter further complicates the equation by showing that 
the ‘real’ does not necessarily have to be ‘actual’ either.  
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Bewes’s observation of ‘realism’ and ‘authenticity’ as privileged concepts is 
repeated by Gerald Gaylard in the mid-2000s. Writing of the digital virtual industry in 
the article “Postmodern Archaic: The Return of the Real in Digital Virtuality”, 
Gaylard notes how it “often emphasizes its naturalism and realism” (N.p.). 
Surprisingly, for an industry that is so reliant on technology, it “currently sells itself 
less on its ability to abstract than on its increased high-focus representational 
resolution” (Gaylard N.p.). Using the reality television show Survivor, Gaylard first 
points out that contemporary ‘realism’ demands two things, “spontaneity” (N.p.) and 
“spatiality” (N.p.) to appear authentic. The illusion of spontaneity gives the television 
show the illusion of being ‘live’ and therefore ‘authentic’ to audiences (Gaylard N.p.). 
Spatiality for Gaylard on the other hand, refers to a “postmodern archaic” (N.p.). The 
“archaic” for Gaylard is “a sign of an authentic common past” (N.p.), while “what is 
postmodern about this archaism in contemporary culture is the extent to which it is 
reified as a simulation” (N.p.). Due to the way that modern technology has become 
“fast enough to capture or outpace reality” (Gaylard N.p.), the ‘archaic’ appears to be 
‘real, spontaneous, live’ (Gaylard N.p.). In the case of Survivor, Gaylard then argues 
that the postmodern archaic is used to test the ‘progress’ of modern society (N.p.). 
Images of ‘nature’, of the outback, the savannah and the island are yardsticks to 
measure how far modern society has come from its perceived ‘roots’ and to determine 
if society can return to it (N.p.).  
As can be seen, like Bewes, Gaylard recognises that ‘realism’ is not 
necessarily tied to ‘actuality’. For example, Gaylard argues that “realism has been 
characterized… as the belief in the ability of signs to represent an objectively 
verifiable world accurately” (N.p.). He then notes that “the signs that are taken to be 
realistically representative are culturally specific” (N.p.), thus recognising that 
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‘realism’ can be based on abstract (i.e. ‘non-actual’) things such as perception, culture 
and beliefs. Secondly, perhaps taking the argument one step further than Bewes, 
Gaylard’s article points to the way ‘realism’ is used in new media. Gaylard bases his 
analysis of Survivor on the premise that “realism serves to provide a coherent and 
comforting narrative by offering an apparent anchorage in actuality” (N.p.). This 
complicates the relationship between actuality and reality. If reality can be ‘used’ and 
‘functions’ in a way that feeds the belief in and appearance of a “comforting 
narrative” (Gaylard N.p.) then ‘reality’ is inherently unstable and can be manipulated 
simply by producing the ‘signs’ that simulate ‘reality’. Pushing the implications of 
this further, arguably, the ‘virtual’ can become as ‘real’ as the ‘actual’ if the ‘virtual’ 
becomes capable of simulating reality.  
Returning to The Matrix, this argument is hinted at by the character Cypher. 
When making a deal with Agent Smith to betray Morpheus and his crew, Cypher says 
to Smith, “I know this steak doesn’t exist. I know that when I put it in my mouth, the 
Matrix is telling my brain that it is juicy and delicious… Ignorance is bliss” (The 
Matrix). David Gunkel, who has been cited earlier, notes that “Unlike Neo, who 
decides for the truth, Cypher chooses deception” (196) and is thus vilified for it (202). 
However, Gunkel also recognises that the choice between the red and blue pill can be 
seen as a choice between one ‘reality’ over another, as the world within the Matrix is, 
arguably, as real as the barren wasteland that makes up the actual world (208). In 
other words, when Cypher discusses how the steak tastes like a ‘real’ steak even when 
it is only the Matrix simulating the sensation of eating steak, he is suggesting that it is 
as real as eating an actual piece of steak. Gunkel then argues that choosing the virtual 
‘reality’ of the Matrix is no different from choosing the ‘real’ world of the Zions since 
it still privileges the ‘real’ (213). Regardless of whether that is a satisfactory argument 
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or not, what can be gathered from the vilification of Cypher though, is an anxiety over 
the status of ‘reality’. If “realism has been characterized… as the belief in the ability 
of signs to represent an objectively verifiable world accurately” (Gaylard N.p.) then 
this belief is now in crisis. Questions regarding the status of the ‘virtual’ world 
created by technology must now be called into question. If modern technology can 
simulate ‘reality’ then how does one tell the difference between what is real and what 
is not? More to the point, does it really matter if the difference cannot be seen? If the 
virtual world created by modern technology can simulate ‘reality’ until it is 
indistinguishable from the actual world, can the virtual world be considered ‘real’ as 
well?  
The recognition that reality is not necessarily tied to actuality thus opens up an 
avenue of anxiety regarding the statuses of virtuality, actuality and reality in the age 
of modern technology. Whether one examines Baudrillard’s works on simulation or 
more recent critics’ works on the impact of modern technology such as those cited 
above, a similar argument nuanced perhaps in different ways arises: the instability of 
reality. That is not to say that modern technology causes reality to become unstable. 
Rather, I argue instead that the impact of modern technology is its revealing of the 
innate instability of reality. Certainly, the perception that modern technology has 
somehow altered the relationship between virtuality, actuality and reality is present in 
the films chosen. In the following, I thus examine the different ways that anxiety over 
the instability and mutability of reality surfaces in these films, and how they engage 





Chapter Two: Cloverfield (2008) and the Home Video Aesthetic 
The use of ‘home video aesthetics’ or ‘documentary aesthetics’ in fully 
fictional films is by no means a novel concept. From the 1980s, the use of these 
aesthetics in fictional films to create a sense of realism was already present. Cannibal 
Holocaust (1980), for example, based on an academic’s search for a film production 
team that went missing while filming a documentary about cannibal tribes, used 
cinematographic techniques like the handheld camera and shaky footage to create a 
sense of authenticity and realism (“Cannibal Holocaust” N.p.). This technique was so 
successful in confusing the audiences over what is ‘real’ and what is not, that the 
director, Ruggero Deodato, was even arrested because audiences believed he had 
really killed the actors in the film (“Cannibal Holocaust” N.p.). Moreover, the use of 
‘documentary’ aesthetics has not been limited to art house films, budget films or the 
horror genre. More recent example include the comedic ‘mockumentary’ This Is 
Spinal Tap (1984), the low-budget horror film Paranormal Activity (2007), its 
sequels, and the high-budget Science Fiction and horror film this chapter is based on, 
Cloverfield (2008).  
Before going into a deeper analysis of Cloverfield (2008), I first use the film, 
The Blair Witch Project (1999), to illustrate how earlier films and critics have 
engaged with the use of ‘documentary’ aesthetics in fictional films. Taking this film 
as an example of how documentary is traditionally used as a cinematographic ploy in 
fictional films, I then contrast it with Cloverfield to show how the latter breaks from 
this tradition. Namely, that while historically, ‘documentary’ aesthetics were largely 
used for the specific purpose of confusing audiences over the fictional or non-fictional 
status of the film, in Cloverfield, it is assumed that the viewer will recognise the ploy 
as something used deliberately for aesthetic purposes, and wouldn’t be fooled by it. 
25 
 
Though some critics such as Daniel North (whose article will be analysed in greater 
detail later) argue that “the film uses this aesthetic of opacity to construct a critique of 
film’s apparent realism” (76), I argue otherwise.  Instead, by drawing on the various 
ways the film was marketed, such as the teaser trailer, the official website and the 
unofficial websites for the film, I argue that the tense and complex relationship 
between ‘reality’, ‘actuality’, ‘virtuality’ and ‘modern technology’ is displaced from 
the fictional status of the film and onto the non-fictional status of the product. By 
presenting the experience of enjoying this film as an investigative process, the 
marketing techniques adopted for the promotion of this film highlights, ironically, the 
‘actuality’ of the media product. ‘Reality’ is thus grounded in the ‘factuality’ of the 
production process and in the ‘reality’ of a team of filmmakers who come together to 
create the media product using modern technology, and who can thus leave clues that 
the viewer can ‘locate’ if they are well-versed enough in the language of the medium. 
The question over the way film and other audio-visual media can simulate reality is 
counteracted by the presence, not necessarily seen but definitely felt, of the human 
being in the production process.  
 First, I wish to start with an analysis of The Blair Witch Project which 
screened in 1999. For a budget movie that took an estimated USD (United States 
Dollars) 60 000 to make, it turned out to be a surprising success, earning well over a 
million US dollars during the opening weekend (“The Blair Witch Project” N.p.). The 
plot of the movie itself is quite straightforward: three young filmmakers decide to 
make a documentary about a local urban legend called the Blair witch. As the film 
progresses, things go from bad to worse for the filmmakers as they continuously make 
mistakes, such as getting lost in the woods, or encounter frightening experiences. By 
the end of the film, all three filmmakers are missing, presumed dead. A plot such as 
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this is not uncommon in the horror genre. Alien (1979) for example, uses a similar 
plot, where a group of people venturing unknowingly into a foreign space encounter a 
horrible monster that starts killing them off. What is not quite as straightforward is the 
way in which the The Blair Witch Project is presented. Instead of using the narrative 
features of a fictional film as Alien (1979) does, the film adopts the form of a 
‘documentary’. This is highlighted by the beginning of the film which declares that 
the footage to be screened is the only thing left behind by a trio of filmmakers who 
have disappeared in the woods near Burkittsville (The Blair Witch Project). More to 
the point, the film simulates documentary’s desire to represent the world, to “record 
situations and events with considerable fidelity” (Nichols 2-3). By adopting the use of 
the handheld camera and rather amateurish camerawork that results in shaky footage, 
off-centred framing and poor video quality, the film simulates someone filming an 
event as it is happening spontaneously. This generates the sensation of ‘realism’ as the 
event appears un-staged, unplanned and thus ‘authentic’.  
The use of the ‘documentary’ form to simulate realism in The Blair Witch 
Project has resulted in much discussion centring on the significance and effects of it. 
Some of these discussions are explored by David Banash in “The Blair Witch Project: 
Technology, Repression, and the Evisceration of Mimesis”. According to Banash, The 
Blair Witch Project’s distinctive use of the documentary form is often celebrated as a 
return to an ‘authenticity’ that somehow bypasses modern technologies of 
reproduction (N.p.). The main obsession of most reviewers, Banash claims, is “that 
the film somehow by-passes technology altogether, returning us to an authentic 
psychological… rather than technical horror” (N.p.). The Blair Witch Project’s 
success is thus often attributed to its recognition that “total mimesis no longer 
frightens audiences so desensitized that they can watch any evisceration 
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disinterestedly” (Banash N.p.). Hence, by ‘rejecting’ the “over-budgeted, over-
produced, studio monsters of all genres” (Banash N.p.), part of the film’s fascination 
arises from the “idolization of indie hip” (Banash N.p.).       
However, Banash claims that the argument that The Blair Witch Project 
returns to a state of authentic psychological horror by side-stepping modern 
technology is highly inaccurate (N.p.). The Blair Witch Project does not bypass 
technology at all; it is about modern technology (Banash N.p.). As Banash argues, the 
film is “the deconstruction of the possibility of such authenticities in our 
technologically mediated culture, and the return of this knowledge is where the real 
horror of the film is to be found” (N.p.). Though critics of The Blair Witch Project 
often cite the film’s use of low-budget technology as a “supposed ludic repression of 
technology and return to authenticity” (Banash N.p.), ironically, what is left behind by 
the filmmakers within the narrative are the film cans and the tapes, essentially, the 
modern technology that went into the creation of the film (Banash N.p.). What is truly 
repressive, what prevents a clear and complete recording of the subjects, is not the 
witch, nature, or the supernatural, but modern technology’s mediating role in the 
world (Banash N.p.). It is modern technology that creates that space for the audience 
to imagine the horror happening on screen. Hence, Banash argues, it is precisely “our 
powerlessness in a world saturated with, but immune to, a technological mimesis” 
(N.p.) that is the true subject of horror in the film.  
Even though David Banash hails the film as “the allegorical moment of our 
postmodern media-scape” (N.p.), his argument is based largely on a recognition of the 
film as fictional. To recognise that the film is making a statement about the failure of 
modern technology to comprehend the world requires firstly the appreciation that the 
film is constructed, and is thus fictional. However, at least in the early years of the 
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film’s screening, this was not the case for some audiences. Margrit Schreier in “Please 
Help Me”, for example, notes how The Blair Witch Project makes use of the 
documentary form and viral marketing strategy to cause some viewers to wonder if 
the film could be ‘real’ or confuse others into mistaking fiction for fact (306). The 
filmmakers of The Blair Witch Project promoted the film mostly through the Internet, 
using a website that featured photographs of the ‘missing’ students, interviews with 
the students’ friends and family and even false news bulletins about the ‘missing’ 
students (Schreier 319). These featured items, like the film, were made to appear 
‘authentic’, and were very successful in convincing viewers of their legitimacy. For 
example, Schreier notes that soon after the film’s release, people who have watched 
the film started turning up at the town of Burkittsville where the film was shot, hoping 
to ‘help’ efforts to find the three students (306). As was the case with Cannibal 
Holocaust, the ‘home video’ aesthetics of The Blair Witch Project was used to create 
confusion over the ‘reality’ of the film. The role of the ‘home video’ within the genre 
was to generate suspense and fear with its simulation of ‘reality’.     
This is quite unlike the postmodern recognition of the failure of technology 
that Banash describes. If anything, this phenomenon where some viewers 
misrecognise the status of ‘reality’ of the film suggests the success of modern 
technology in simulating reality. For the media-savvy viewer, one who is both 
proficient with film and the use of the Internet, these promotional materials 
potentially deepen the confusion over the status of reality of the film. Hence, it is 
clear that the marketing strategy and production process of The Blair Witch Project 
demonstrates a concerted attempt by the filmmakers to confuse or even convince the 
viewer of the ‘authenticity’ of the film. If the misleading promotional material is not 
enough, even the way the film was made suggests an attempt to simulate authenticity 
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as much as possible. Schreier, for example, notes how the directors employed method 
filmmaking, where the actors were given only the briefest instruction on how to use 
the camera, almost no contact with the crew and insufficient supplies for the entire 
filming period (320). This, in a way, made the fear and hunger shown on screen 
authentic and thus more realistic for the viewers.    
This is in direct contrast with the approach the filmmakers of Cloverfield took 
to this particular film. Like The Blair Witch Project, Cloverfield has a rather 
straightforward and generic ‘monster film’ narrative. During the farewell party of the 
main protagonist, Rob, a monster of unknown origins and nature attacks New York, 
causing panic and chaos to spread through the city. While Rob tries to escape with a 
group of friends and family amidst the chaos caused by the creature’s destructive 
behaviour, he gets a call for help from Beth, the woman he loves. Rob and his friends 
thus attempt to rescue Beth who is trapped in her apartment which collapsed partially 
during the monster attack, and escape from New York before the military launches an 
airstrike against the monster. Along the way, the members of the group are killed off 
one at a time by parasites that drop off the monster’s body, the monster itself and even 
the military, which bombs the entire area in a desperate attempt to destroy the 
monster. Only one person, Lily, is assumed to have survived the attack. Like The 
Blair Witch Project, the narrative of Cloverfield is thus quite straightforward and 
formulaic of the ‘monster movie’ genre. Also, similar to The Blair Witch Project, 
Cloverfield uses a ‘documentary’ or ‘home video’ form. Most of the events of the 
attack and the rescue of Beth are filmed by a handheld camera held by Hud, Rob’s 
best friend. However, Rob also films small portions of the film, notably after Hud 
dies. An outing with Beth that takes place before the attack by the unknown monster 
is also filmed by Rob. The recording of the outing is ‘accidentally’ filmed over by 
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Hud, thus leaving only short clips of it interspaced between clips showing the events 
of the attack by the monster.  
 Ostensibly, Cloverfield is quite similar to The Blair Witch Project in many 
ways. However, crucially, Cloverfield differs from The Blair Witch Project in that the 
filmmakers of Cloverfield do not seem to have made an attempt to truly trick viewers 
into believing that the events that take place in the film are real. For one thing, unlike 
the events in The Blair Witch Project which take place in an isolated patch of woods 
near a small American town, the events depicted in Cloverfield take place in New 
York, a densely populated and well-known area in America. Any attack there by a 
giant monster as tall as a skyscraper would hardly go unnoticed by the residents, 
especially when the entire city is bombed in the end by the military. For another, the 
promotional materials for Cloverfield do not make the same attempt as the 
promotional material of The Blair Witch Project to confuse viewers over the ‘reality’ 
of the film. Rebecca Coyle, in “Point of Audition”, notes, for example, that the 
official website for the movie featured the ringtone of the monster’s roar (218). There 
is also merchandise with sound components, such as a Hasbro toy figure of the 
monster that emits the sound of its roar, that were part of the promotional strategy for 
the film (Coyle 218). From these promotional materials, the viewer would be able to 
gain additional information that is not related in the film. One such example is that the 
monster is supposed to be a baby that was woken up by a falling satellite owned by 
the Japanese Tagruato Corporation (Coyle 221). Hence, the media-savvy viewer 
would get a more informative and enhanced movie viewing experience that is 
recognisable as ‘fictional’.  
 Furthermore, Cloverfield, unlike The Blair Witch Project, is not a low-budget 
film. The budget for the film, according to the Internet Movie Database was roughly 
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about twenty-five million US dollars (N.p.). This is not surprising given the 
technology that went into the making of the film. If The Blair Witch Project uses 
‘real’ hunger and fear to simulate a sense of ‘realism’, Cloverfield uses modern 
technology to the same effect. The focus of Coyle’s article is how various sound 
components go into telling the story of Cloverfield, and a description of some of the 
techniques used highlights how much modern technology goes into creating a rather 
sensational sound experience (218, 222-223). Notably, sound is what gives the 
monster a larger-than-life impression - where the viewer can hear it roar before it 
appears on screen (Coyle 219). In order to create a sense of chaos and violence 
following the appearance of the monster, the “monster noises were mixed into sounds 
that provide a backdrop of rampage and mayhem, a technique also used in the 
Godzilla aural insignia” (Coyle 230). That is, notably, only the sound component of 
the film. The visual elements are highly controlled and produced by modern 
technology too, as seen by the fantastic and spectacular image of the head of the 
Statue of Liberty sitting on the streets of Manhattan. As can be seen, the narrative of 
the film, the promotional strategies and the production process all emphasise the 
artificiality and constructed-ness of the film which, despite the use of the home video 
aesthetic, the filmmakers do not hide. These hint at a different relationship between 
modern technology, virtuality and reality than that suggested by The Blair Witch 
Project and its critics: self-consciousness about the role of modern technology in 
creating a sense of realism.   
One possible way of decoding this relationship can be found in Daniel North’s 
“Evidence of Things Not Quite Seen”. For North, both the promotional strategies of 
Cloverfield as well as the film itself can be seen as a series of absences (77). For 
example, the teaser trailer that was screened did not follow any pre-publicity (North 
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79). The only notable piece of information in the trailer is the release date, which is 
also the code that unlocked the film’s official website (North 79). This website in turn 
only revealed a series of images, “time-stamped to prompt their assembly into a linear 
sequence” (North 79). The lack of information is then further complicated by the lack 
of clarity over what information can be considered canonical (North 80). Due to the 
overwhelming number of blog sites with a large input by fans, it became difficult to 
determine what was rumour and what was pertinent to the film (North 80). Within the 
narrative itself, the use of the home video aesthetic meant a rejection of the 
“omniscient narration of the traditional blockbuster” (North 86). As North notes, at no 
point in the film is the backstory of the monster properly explained, nor is the threat 
ever satisfactorily neutralised (86). Despite all the technology that went into 
generating the special-effects, the effects are hidden and made invisible by the 
restricted perspective of the camera and the shaky hand-held camera effect (North 
87).  
Based on this, North argues that the refusal to provide information about the 
backstory of the film and the deliberate obscuring of images is a way for the film to 
“construct a critique of film’s apparent realism” (76). The amateurish home video 
aesthetic is thus not used to trick viewers into believing the film might be real, as in 
the case of The Blair Witch Project. North argues instead that the disparity between 
form (documentary) and content (fictional plot) is used by the film to make a 
statement about technologies of reproduction (76). Simply put, images “cannot be 
authenticated through appeals to the mechanical objectivity of the equipment, any 
more than they can be authenticated by stamping a Department of Defense watermark 
on them” (North 89-90). Much like Banash in his article on The Blair Witch Project, 
North adopts a different critical route to make a similar point about Cloverfield: that it 
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openly criticises the possibility of using modern technologies of reproduction to 
accurately represent the world. Significantly, North argues that the film does it by 
upsetting the stability of ‘reality’, by proving even images obviously created by 
modern technology can be made to appear realistic through the use of certain 
cinematic styles, which too are created by technology (88).  
Certainly, North’s argument that the film represents a reaction to film realism 
is a valid one. However, given the complexity of the technologies and levels of 
realism that make up this particular film and its promotional materials, it is necessary 
to complicate what could be a slightly simplistic concept of ‘criticising film realism’. 
To do so, I now break this film and the promotional material into different levels. On 
one level is that of the diegetic world: the world where Manhattan is attacked by a 
monster and where Hud, Rob, Beth, Lily and Jason are ‘real’ people. Along with this 
is the promotional material. These are the materials that contribute to the backstory of 
the film and are thus understood to contribute to an understanding of the ‘reality’ of 
the diegetic world. On another level is the production process, where conceivably, 
‘actual’ and ‘real’ people like director Matt Reeves and the actors have put a lot of 
time, effort and money into making and promoting the film Cloverfield. By breaking 
up the product this way, a different perspective from North’s can be seen. I argue that 
instead of criticising ‘film realism’, the film, neutralises the threat of the instability of 
reality by displacing it onto the ‘reality’ of the production process and the human 
presence.  
Hence, in the following, this thesis demonstrates how, contrary to what North 
writes, the film does more than criticise ‘film realism’; it potentially points to a 
changing attitude towards ‘reality’ with regards to ‘technology’. There are several 
moments in the film that suggest this, but one of the more prominent one is the 
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sequence starting when Hud, the character who has been ‘behind’ the camera all this 
while, is killed by the monster and extends all the way until the end of the film when 
Rob and Beth are presumed to have been killed by the bombing of Manhattan. 
For the entirety of the film, a lot of effort is put into explaining the presence of 
the camera and why Hud continues filming. At first, it starts with Lily persuading 
Jason, Rob’s brother and her boyfriend, to record Rob’s farewell party as a way for 
him to ‘remember’ them. Jason later shifts that responsibility to Hud. Even after the 
attack starts and the characters encounter numerous dangers, such as an attack by 
violent alien parasites in the train tunnel, Hud continues filming the events happening 
around them. This is because, he explains, people will want to know what happened 
during the attack (Cloverfield). Hence, like Lily, Hud’s intention for filming the 
escape is as a form of record, for people to ‘know’ of and ‘remember’ by. Towards 
the end of the film, Hud gets his wish; he gets the perfect shot of the monster as it 
towers above him shortly before it kills him. Then a bizarre thing happens; even 
though the monster is near them, even though Hud had just died, and even though the 
military is minutes away from bombing the city, Rob picks up the camera as he and 
Beth flee, and continues recording. Certainly, this odd moment could be explained 
away as a filmic necessity. If the camera is not picked up, if the camera stops 
recording then the film ends there. However, I argue that this moment can be seen as 
more than a way of extending screen time. The segment of the film that starts with 
Rob picking up the camera and ends with Rob’s and Beth’s confused and tearful 
recording of their last words could be seen as a representation of the ‘information 
high’.  
In “Addicts Without Drugs”, Mark Roberts discusses a form of addiction that 
he refers to as media addiction (339-340). The media addict, Roberts writes, “hungers 
35 
 
for… an information high – information in the form of electronically produced images 
and sounds, flashing signs of the real without reality or substance” (340). He or she is 
also “obsessed by a desire to serve as a kind of anonymous monitoring screen of the 
hyperreal… of the scenic repetition of disembodied sounds and images” (Roberts 
343). Media addicts are also “concerned primarily with monitoring faithfully an event 
as if it was being recorded through some medium – a concern of how one might 
appear within another image… inspired, in most instances, by yet another image” 
(Roberts 346). The media addict thus “craves to become the medium itself” (Roberts 
346).  
For Roberts, this form of media addiction can be explained in the “radically 
different ways we have come to view human subjectivity vis à vis electronic and 
informational media” (346). Drawing on Mark Poster’s argument that database and 
informational technologies have created a multiplication of the individual and thus 
characteristics originally thought to be distinctly human can become implanted onto 
machines, Roberts demonstrates how human subjectivity can be extended to any 
machine, system or medium that can simulate perceived ‘human’ features, like 
feelings and thoughts (347-349). This, Roberts argues, has altered the way humans act 
and relate to themselves (349). The human is compelled to share their own supposedly 
distinctive human attributes with external systems or machines, and with the advent of 
these extensions, the simulation of human attributes can be considered as ‘real’ 
attributes as well (Roberts 349). Humans thus no longer participate in the ‘event’; 
instead the event participates through the human, leaving the subject in a destabilised 
position in relation to the ‘reality’ of events (Roberts 350). All these extensions, 
Roberts suggests, has resulted in the “transformation of whatever was, formerly, 
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construed as the “real”, acting subject… into the mechanistic extensions, into media, 
into pure information” (352).      
Without doubt, the whole of Cloverfield dramatizes what Roberts describes as 
‘media addiction’. Throughout the film, Hud constantly reiterates that he is 
‘documenting’ the attack because others would want to know what happened 
(Cloverfield). In short, both Hud and his viewers hunger for that information high, for 
“the scenic repetition of disembodied sounds and images” (Roberts 343). The ‘event’ 
of the attack is to be turned into a series of sounds and images that, in Hud’s mind, 
adequately replaces it. This is most obvious towards the end of the film after Hud dies 
and Rob picks up the camera. Like Hud, Rob’s purpose for picking up the camera 
appears to be solely for the purpose of ‘documenting’. However, the fact that he 
continues to document, continues to film even at such a critical point (the city was 
about to be bombed in a few minutes) highlights the inability to stop turning the 
‘event’ into images.  
Additionally, right at the end of the film, Rob and Beth’s incoherent recording 
of their final farewell further emphasises the desire to become the medium. When it 
becomes clear that escape is not possible, Rob and Beth take shelter under a bridge. 
There, they make a recording. Specifically, they record their identities onto film. Both 
Rob’s and Beth’s recordings show a clear image of them and start with them stating 
who they are. Assumedly, they do this so in the event that they do not survive, a 
record of their selves still remains in the camera. In short, the image on the camera is 
seen as an adequate replacement for the actual, physical person by Rob, the one who 
initiates the recording and encourages Beth to do one too. The real and actual subject 
has thus been literally transformed into the image that is “pure information” (Roberts 
352). Additionally, the continuation of documentation panders to the desire for 
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information of the viewers. It allows the viewers to learn what happened to Rob and 
Beth, and to voyeuristically take part in their final declaration of love for each other. 
The tension between the two is thus resolved for the viewer by the documentation of 
their true feelings for each other just as the bombs fall. The ‘reality’ of their affection 
for each other is thus reaffirmed, ironically, by allowing their ‘virtual’ declaration on 
screen to survive the decimation of their ‘actual’ bodies.  
As can be seen from the above analysis, the changing views on and status of 
‘reality’ are evident. The film recognises that technology can simulate reality such 
that it is indistinguishable from the ‘real’. At the same time, the filmmakers appear to 
recognise that this is no longer a particularly novel concept. Even if the viewers of 
The Blair Witch Project in the 1990s could be tricked by the documentary format, the 
viewers of the twenty-first century may not be so easily fooled. Hence, films like 
Cloverfield can no longer attempt to generate suspense by ‘tricking’ viewers into 
believing that the film is non-fictional. At this point, the question of anxiety must be 
raised again. Does the recognition that modern technology can simulate ‘reality’ mean 
an acceptance of it? Is there no anxiety over modern technology’s ability to not only 
simulate ‘reality’, but to do so to a point that it is indistinguishable from ‘reality’?  
To answer these questions, it helps to remember that the film, Cloverfield, was 
designed by the filmmakers to be one part in a series of clues that reveals what 
happened during the attack by the monster on Manhattan. Hence, to consider the clues 
dropped by the promotional material as part of the filmic experience is necessary for a  
fuller understanding of the complex relationship between modern technology and 
reality. Many of these strategies have been mentioned earlier in this chapter: the teaser 
trailer and the official website that leaked tiny bits of information over time are some 
of the more often mentioned ones. However, there are many others, including 
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“MySpace pages for the main characters, and another fully-formed website for a 
fictional Japanese drink called Slusho” (North 79). Furthermore, unofficial sites such 
as blogs and forums that attempted to piece together the pieces of the puzzle that have 
been presented to viewers were formed. In short, as North notes, spectators have 
understood that this was “a puzzle to be solved” (81). They are expected to be active 
“participants in a search for the information necessary to pre-imagine it and then to 
unravel its mysteries” (North 77).  
This puts a slightly different slant to the relationship between ‘reality’ and 
‘technology’. For even if modern technology is more than capable of simulating 
‘reality’ to the point that it is ‘reality’, any anxiety that might be caused by that 
recognition is displaced by the ‘actuality’ of the product and the ‘reality’ of the human 
presence behind these products. By pointing to the various ways the film was 
marketed, such as the teaser trailer, the official website and the unofficial websites for 
the film, I have shown that the tense and complex relationship between ‘reality’, 
‘actuality’, ‘virtuality’ and ‘modern technology’ is displaced from the fictional status 
of the film and onto the non-fictional status of the product. Ironically, by allowing 
viewers to participate in this active hunt for information, the presence of the 
filmmakers, the director, the producer, the special effects team, and all the other units 
that go into the making of this film and its promotional materials is highlighted. For 
example, in the blog site Cloverfield Clues, some of the blog posts include “J.J. 
Abrams at Wondercon on Cloverfield Sequel” and “Cinefex Cloverfield Photos”. 
These blog posts are not so much about the film itself but about the production of the 
film. The first blog post demonstrates the powerful awareness of the audience of an 
‘actual’, ‘real’ person behind the production of this film and its promotional materials. 
Even if the majority of the viewers would not have met him as an ‘actual’ person, his 
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presence, the ‘virtual’ but ‘real’, is still highly visible. The second blog post describes 
and explains in some detail the kind of special effects that went into making the 
movie (Dennis N.p.), hence underlining the fact that there are ‘actual’ technologies 
and people that go into creating this film. The fact that the narrative of the film itself 
dramatizes the way technologies of media can simulate reality does not necessarily 
mean the film does not demonstrate any anxiety over its capability to do so. Any 
anxiety that could potentially arise from the ease in which the ‘real’ can turn into 
‘images’ (or even desires to turn into ‘images’) is minimised by the way the 
promotional materials continually highlight the ‘actuality’ of the production process. 
If the film shows how technology can simulate reality, the promotional materials 
show that ‘actual’ people are the masters of that technology, and that behind every 













Chapter Three: Documenting the Body in District 9 (2009) 
In line with this exploration of ‘actual’ or ‘real’ human presences, I now 
discuss the documenting of the body in District 9 (2009). The body in the science 
fiction genre has long been a site of conflict. In one of the texts often acknowledged 
as one of the earliest forms of science fiction, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, the nature 
of humanity is called into question via the body. In this novel, Doctor Frankenstein’s 
creature is rejected from society because his body is deformed and thus does not 
appear to be ‘human’. It matters little to the characters he encounters, such as Felix, 
Safie and Agatha that he is not a violent monster despite his hideous appearance 
(Shelley 170). As his body appears to be that of a monster’s, they ‘write’ the identity 
of ‘monster’ onto him, viewing him with “horror and consternation” upon first seeing 
him (Shelley 170). So influenced by the writing of that identity on him is the creature 
that he starts to accept it, and to believe that only one whose body is like his can 
accept him for who he is (Shelley 183). Through this story, Shelley explores themes 
of identity and how the body is the tabula on which it is, accurately or not, written.  
Throw into the equation modern technologies of communication and the link 
between body and identity becomes even more complicated. In “Screening 
(In)formation”, Jennifer Bay discusses the connection between the human body and 
the physical screens the body encounters on a daily basis (26). For Bay, the human 
body is a screen of sorts, as it “screens information that it receives through sensory 
apparatuses, bodily filters, neural activities, and cognitive operations, and yet it also 
functions as a screen on which culture and identity are projected” (27). This is much 
like how the creature is in Shelley’s Frankenstein, where its initial explorations of the 
world were through its sensory organs. For example, some of its earlier coherent 
memories were of sensations, of feeling hunger and cold, and of seeing the night sky 
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for the first time (Shelley 127-128). Its initial interactions with other humans also 
taught it that it was the “unnatural hideousness of my person [that] was the chief 
object of horror” (Shelley 166), hence indicating it is aware that its identity is written 
onto its physical self by others. Bay also notes that our screening bodies are always in 
contact with technological screens, such as computers, televisions and phones, and 
that in these points of contact, the bodies become “refracted and reflected images” 
(27). “The material boundary between technological artefact and body is blurred, and 
the body simultaneously becomes image, information, and material object” (Bay 27).  
One of the bodily ‘screens’ Bay mentions is the skin, which is where the 
human body meets the external environment (30). She then links it to the ‘skins’ of 
the online world, where the term could refer to a graphical avatar used in gaming 
communities, which is often perceived as a substitute for a real body, or the graphical 
covering that many use to personalise software interfaces (31). Just like the skin of the 
human body, these virtual ‘skins’ are used as screens on which the self is projected 
and identities are formed (Bay 31). At the same time, like the human skin, these 
‘skins’ also allow for the knowing, understanding and accessing of the world (Bay 
31). More importantly, the skin is screen and thus permeable, which means it is 
constantly moving, absorbing and exuding information (Bay 32). Hence, for Bay, the 
body constantly shifts in meaning, depending on a variety of contexts (32).  
Through Bay’s article, a sense of the kind of issues that surround the body, 
identity and modern technology can be seen. Notably, one of the key issues present is 
the further destabilisation of the body and identity in the age of modern technology. 
Just as the ‘documentary’ aesthetics in ‘found-footage’ films can subvert a viewer’s 
sense of reality, so too can the advent of technologies like online ‘skins’ undermine a 
person’s identity. The ‘skin’ adopted online, such as an avatar, can be quite different 
42 
 
from the ‘actual’ body of the human that adopts that ‘skin’, thus the identity of the 
human can be rewritten onto the virtual avatar. The human body no longer remains 
the sole site on which identity is projected, unlike the case in Frankenstein. The body 
is also no longer a stable entity as it can be rewritten with great ease. The privileging 
of the ‘actuality’ of the body is thus threatened by the ‘virtuality’ of the online body. 
In this case, the word ‘threatened’ is used quite deliberately. For even though Bay 
seems to adopt a positive attitude towards the way identity can be reinterpreted in an 
online context, I argue that an anxiety still exists over the unstable body and can be 
seen in recent Science Fiction films.  
One of these films is Avatar (2009). Avatar is set in an unknown time on a 
planet known as Pandora, home to a species of aliens known as the Na’vi. The main 
protagonist, Jake Sully, a crippled ex-soldier, is given the chance to take his dead 
twin’s place on a project in Pandora. As they both share the same genetics, he is able 
to insert his consciousness into an ‘avatar’ that had been specially designed for his 
twin. This ‘avatar’ is, significantly, a human-Na’vi hybrid. Entering the ‘avatar’ gives 
Sully the ability to breathe in the poisonous atmosphere of Pandora and get close to 
the Na’vi, thus giving him a unique entry into the fantastic realm of Pandora. Though 
Jake’s job in Pandora is initially to help Doctor Grace Augustine’s botanical research 
and to provide intelligence on the Na’vi in the event that the human military decides 
to launch an attack against them, Jake ends up falling in love with a Na’vi, Neytiri, 
and fighting with the Na’vi against the brutal, militant humans. By the end of the film, 
he permanently transplants his consciousness into his avatar to become part of the 
Na’vi. 
As can be seen by this summary, the body is at the centre of the movie. Jake 
Sully, a crippled ex-soldier who is mocked by other soldiers for his disability, gains a 
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fresh start in his avatar. Not only does it have the full use of its legs, it is also taller 
and stronger than the average human, and allows Sully, via the use of the neural 
queue at the end of its tail, to harness the powers of the Pandora forests and turn them 
against the militant technology of the humans. The use of the avatar also liberates him 
from his damaged human body and allows him to adopt both the identity of a human 
and a Na’vi, just like how his avatar is a hybrid of these two species. If Colonel 
Quaritch questions Jake’s choice of adopting the Na’vi identity and sneers at the 
possibility of Jake ‘becoming’ a Na’vi, the film emphasises the possibility of adopting 
a new identity by giving Jake, not just a new Na’vi body, but an esteemed Na’vi 
identity as the legendary Toruk Mato. However, though the film seems to celebrate 
the possibility of gaining a new identity through modern technologies that allow the 
human to insert his or her consciousness into a different body, the idea that the 
‘actual’ body must be present for identity to be projected on it is still there. For Jake 
to identify with the Na’vi, he has to first don his avatar, that though technically a 
human-Na’vi hybrid, certainly resembles a true Na’vi in appearance. In the end, Jake 
permanently enters his avatar thus cancelling the instability of the ‘actual’ body. If he 
starts the film with only one body, he also ends it with only one. The ‘actuality’ of the 
body, the stability of the body is thus reaffirmed. 
The body in the science fiction film, as seen from this brief analysis of Avatar, 
is still in question, as much as it was in the days of Shelley’s Frankenstein. The 2009 
science fiction film, District 9, is in turn an interesting addition to this long history of 
discourse over the body in the genre. Part of the reason is because the film is very 
self-conscious of not just how identity is projected onto the body, but how modern 
technologies of communication (eg. news broadcasts, television, documentaries) 
frame this projection. As discussed in the chapter on Cloverfield, technologies of film 
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are used to create certain aesthetic effects that indicate not just the genre of the film 
being watched, but the effect it is meant to have when it crosses into another genre. In 
District 9, this recognition is carried further into an exploration of the way ideologies 
of the body and identity are implicated in these aesthetics. Hence, in the following, I 
am going to do an analysis of the ‘body’ in District 9. Primarily, I argue that the film 
demonstrates an anxiety over the stability of the body in the age of modern 
technology. Through the narrative plot of a human who slowly transforms into an 
alien after being exposed to alien technology, the film expresses an anxiety over the 
way the body can be mutated or altered by modern technology. At the same time, I 
also argue that the film expresses an anxiety over the way modern technologies of 
communication frame the discourse of the (mutated) body. By examining the use of 
two separate narrative forms, the documentary and the narrative film, I show how the 
film criticises the elevated status of the documentary as factual, objective and ‘actual’, 
and thus complicit in the ideological framing of the body. Finally, I argue that though 
the film expresses an anxiety over the instability of the body caused by modern 
technologies, it ultimately attempts to cancel out these anxieties by suggesting that 
intangible but real ‘human’ qualities such as romantic love, courage and self-sacrifice 
remain constant despite the mutability of the ‘actual’ human body. The privileging of 
the ‘real’ thus remains.  
Screened in 2009, District 9 is set in Johannesburg, South Africa, where an 
indeterminate time ago, an alien spacecraft mysteriously arrived and remained 
hovering over the city. When humans entered the spaceship, they discovered a ship 
full of aliens suffering from severe malnutrition. Unsure of what had happened to 
them, humans granted the aliens permission to take residence in the poverty-stricken 
area of the city known as District 9. No one knows what the real name of the race of 
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aliens is, so they are referred to derogatorily as ‘prawns’. In the beginning, the film 
adopts a documentary style of filming which shows the protagonist, Wikus van der 
Merwe helping the MNU, a private organization with interest in the alien’s advanced 
technology but little interest in the welfare of the aliens, serve eviction notices to the 
aliens to relocate them to District 10. While serving a notice to an alien named 
Christopher, Wikus accidentally gets contaminated by an unknown substance that 
Christopher had been collecting to fuel a spacecraft that will take him back to the 
mother ship floating above the city. At this point, the film abandons the documentary 
style and uses the style of a narrative film to tell the story. Wikus, unaware of what 
had happened to him, gets progressively ill as his body starts to mutate into an alien’s. 
He is then taken into custody where experiments and tests are performed on him, 
proving that his mutation into an alien has made him biologically suitable to use the 
alien’s weapons. The scientists thus decide to kill him and harvest his genetic material 
for further research. Wikus manages to escape and teams up with Christopher. 
Though initially suspicious and hostile towards each other, they end up working 
together. Wikus helps Christopher steal back the fuel from the MNU, and in return, 
Christopher promises to bring Wikus to the mother ship and find a cure for his 
mutation. Eventually, after an attack on the MNU and other events, Wikus sacrifices 
himself to allow Christopher to escape to the mother ship. The film then switches 
back to a documentary style, with interviews with ‘experts’, Wikus’s old colleagues 
and his wife, each speculating about his unknown fate. Eventually, the film ends with 
a shot of an alien, presumably Wikus, making a flower out of scrap metal.           
Like in Frankenstein and Avatar, the instability of the body has become a site 
of anxiety. Given South Africa’s history of apartheid, it seems almost inevitable that 
the little research that has been written about District 9 has been about the didactic 
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discourse on race present in the film. In “Race and Revenge Fantasies” for example, 
John Rieder discusses the trend in three films, including District 9, as one of 
“spectacularly violent, racialised revenge fantasy” (41). In his opinion, this kind of 
racialised revenge fantasy draws upon a popular resentment towards issues like rising 
crime rates or the fading of traditional values, and directs it against a “fictional, 
demonised object” (Rieder 43), the objective of this is to cash in on the “daydreams” 
of the audiences (Rieder 44). There is thus the “fetishistic demonization” of figures 
that represent some perceived ‘evil’ ideology, such as Koobus, the white, hyper-
masculine mercenary, in District 9, following which they are violently dispatched 
(Rieder 51). The purpose of this is not so much to engage with the real source of the 
audience’s resentment, which is presumably untouchable, but to redirect it onto a 
cinematic substitute (Rieder 44).  
Though Rieder understandably approaches the issue from the point of view of 
‘race’ and the ‘racial’ body, I argue that ‘race’ is only a part of the question of the 
body in these films, and in particular, District 9. Certainly, one can see where 
Rieder’s argument comes from when he suggests that the conflict is presented in 
highly racialised terms. The final battle in District 9 is between the half-human, half-
alien Wikus and the white, hyper-masculine, mercenary, Koobus who works for the 
very rich and powerful private company, MNU. Koobus, this figure of white 
capitalism and militancy is then torn apart violently by aliens: those figured so 
prominently as a repressed ‘other’ race in the film. However, as can be seen from this 
description, ‘race’ is only one identity that is written onto the body. The aliens and 
Wikus are seen as ‘other’ because they look different from humans, and their physical 
appearance is used to project a certain identity on them as seen by how they are 
named (identified as) ‘prawns’. Koobus, in turn, has his race written onto him. As he 
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looks human and looks ‘white’, his identity, both in terms of species and race, are 
written onto him. ‘Race’ is only a part of it: the physical body in its entirety is the 
tabula in which others project whatever identity that they wish onto it. This can be 
seen most clearly in Wikus’s mutation into an alien. As a human male, the identities 
written onto Wikus are varied. He is an employee of the MNU, human, a husband, a 
son-in-law and a cruel oppressor of the aliens. The moment his body starts to mutate 
however, the identities written onto him change. He becomes one of the oppressed, 
his father-in-law rejects their relationship and chooses to harvest him for research, he 
is reduced to a mere science experiment and he is treated as ‘alien’ to others. More 
importantly, as shall be discussed later, the media, such as the news, also projects 
other identities onto him, including criminality and sexual perversion, such as when a 
news report claims that he gained his strange mutation through sexual intercourse 
with alien prostitutes. ‘Racial’ identity is thus just a part of the identity projected onto 
the body.  
What is even more interesting for me though is not the conflict between 
‘human’ and ‘alien’, but the body in the intermediate stage between these two points. 
Even though, as Rieder mentions and as the film demonstrates, to be ‘alien’ is to be 
put in a position of disenfranchisement, the point at which Wikus experiences the 
greatest anxiety is not when he turns into an alien but while he is still turning into one. 
The point at which he is the most vulnerable and open to exploitation is also the point 
when he is still half-human and half-alien. This is made quite clear by the way the 
film chronicles his mutation into an alien. As a human, Wikus is clearly very 
comfortable where he is, happy with his marriage and his status of power over the 
aliens. When he is seen as a full alien at the end of the film, he is calmly making a 
flower out of scrap metal, which the audience knows from earlier scenes, he leaves at 
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his devoted wife’s doorstep, hence indicating he is still in a loving relationship with 
her. It also indicates he is no longer concerned about his identity as an alien, as he is 
not searching for a cure to his mutation like he has been doing the entire film, but 
sitting still in a junkyard with his mind focused on creating a gift for his wife. 
However, when he is still turning into an alien is when his identity is most unstable. 
That is when the struggle between his desire to be seen as human and the refusal of 
other humans to see him as one is most prominent.  
If the body is the tabula on which identity is written, the unstable body is that 
which destabilises it. In “Is He Still Human”, Elaine Ostry examines the concept of 
the human in science fiction texts for young adults (223). For Ostry, the post-human 
raises questions about the distinction between humans, machines and animals, and 
how these distinctions should be made (224). The challenge raised, she further argues, 
is to the human identity and body (224). Linking the idea of post-humanism and 
young adult literature, Ostry further posits that “The posthuman body is a metaphor 
for how foreign one’s body feels during adolescence, as adolescents must discover 
themselves and reintegrate into their society” (238). The question at hand is one about 
identity and the body in the age of post-humanism. In order to prove her argument, 
Ostry uses many examples from several texts including Cloning Miranda and Violet 
Eyes, and evokes several common tropes in these texts, including half-machine half-
humans (231) and genetic manipulation (242). Of greatest interest to this thesis 
though is her discussion on clones. 
In her discussion of clones in young adult science fiction, Ostry raises two 
points that are of most significance to me. First, she posits that “Central to the clones’ 
debate about identity is the debate between nature and nurture” (226). For example, a 
clone may question whether he or she has a separate self from the host who provided 
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their DNA (Ostry 226). In other words, the question is, whether it is the ‘actual’ 
physical body (the DNA, the cells) or other intangible but equally ‘real’ qualities 
which define who the self is. Second, Ostry notes that the genetically altered young 
adults often develop super powers that make them vulnerable to exploitation (227, 
230). This exploitation, Ostry notes, threatens the characters’ sense of self (230). The 
fear present is of being experimented on and treated as a mere medical commodity 
(Ostry 231). 
These two themes are definitely present in District 9 in the form of Wikus’s 
unstable body. Part of the anxiety he faces when his body starts to mutate is the fear 
that turning into an alien makes him the ‘non-human’. That he ends up being reduced 
to an experimental subject whose welfare the scientists have little or no regard for also 
shows how his perceived degeneration into an ‘inferior’ species leaves him vulnerable 
to exploitation because those with power (the MNU) have the ability to project any 
identity on him that they see fit. The fact that Wikus’s identity and his anxiety over 
his identity is most prominent during the process of transformation thus point to how 
important the body is in the projection of identity. As a human, he faces no crisis 
because he is clearly a human and thus feels his identity is stable. As an alien, 
similarly, because his body is stable, his identity is stable too. However, at the point 
of transformation, his identity becomes unstable because he could be seen as a 
‘human’ who has been infected, and thus treated with the corresponding respect, or he 
could be viewed as an ‘alien’ with left-over human qualities and thus as vulnerable to 
exploitation as those who were born aliens. Stability of identity, linked to the stability 
of the body, regardless of which end of the power relationship the self sits on, is thus 
no cause for anxiety. In short, what can be seen from the film is not just the conflict 
between two ‘races’ in an unbalanced power relationship that Rieder writes about, but 
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the in-between point, the hybrid who, because of his hybridity, loses the stability of 
identity, and unbalances the question of identity even more.  
As can be seen, District 9’s plot centres on the instability of the body much 
like the examples Ostry raises in her article. Significantly, one of the key differences 
between Wikus and the young adults Ostry writes about is that his personal growth 
into adulthood seems quite secondary. For one thing, unlike Ostry’s subjects, Wikus 
is already a grown man and not an adolescent at a stage in life where he is trying to 
define who he is. What seems more important in District 9 is how his mutation and 
his (r)ejection of/from society is framed by the medium of communicative 
technology. This can be seen in a comparison between District 9 and Avatar. 
Compared to Avatar, the instability of the body in District 9 is cause for severe 
anxiety. Part of this has to do with the different kinds of ‘skin’ that are adopted. 
Though Jake Sully enters the body of a race that is not as technologically advanced as 
humans, it is also one that is faster and stronger than a human, and perhaps more 
importantly, not crippled like his human body. The migration of identity is to a 
superior body. For Wikus van der Merwe, his body mutates into the body of a race 
that is perceived as inferior to that of a human, as it is one that marks a ‘prawn’, a 
‘bottom-feeder’ and a ‘cat food addict’. What is interesting here is that though the 
movement from a human body to an alien body is one that is signified by the gaining 
of super powers (eg. Jake’s ability to connect with the creatures of the Pandora forests 
and Wikus’s ability to use the aliens’ technologically advanced weapons), the identity 
written on each shift is framed very differently. Jake’s ability to harness the resources 
in the Pandora forests allows him to achieve flight, for example, and assimilates him 
even more with the N’avi. Wikus’s ability to wield the alien’s weapons, on the other 
hand, alienates him even more from the humans. This highlights the way the modern 
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technologies of communication such as the movie screen frame what identity the 
audience and the characters are supposed to project onto the alien body. It is not just 
the body that defines one’s identity; it is how the body is viewed and how the identity 
of the ‘new’ body is portrayed to others. In order to elaborate on this, I will now go 
into a deeper analysis of the form of the film.  
i) Documenting the Body 
 The form of the movie, as mentioned earlier, can be divided roughly into three 
parts. The first part takes place in the beginning of the film before Wikus was infected 
and when he was still a MNU field operative. This portion of the film adopts the 
aesthetics of non-fictional films, such as that of news footages and documentaries, and 
includes things such as interviews with ‘experts’ and ‘live’ news footage of the 
eviction notices being served. The second portion becomes most prominent from 
around the time of Wikus’s infection to the time when he disappears after confronting 
operatives from the MNU in an attempt to help Christopher escape back to the mother 
ship. In contrast to the first portion of the film, this portion largely uses features of a 
fictional narrative film. For example, the camera is an omniscient one that switches 
between Wikus’s perspective and the perspective of other characters. The camera is 
also the ‘impossible’ camera, in the sense that it films from a position where, in the 
‘real’ world, no camera can logically exist, such as when Wikus wakes up alone and 
disorientated in District 9 or when Christopher is planning the escape to the mother 
ship. After Wikus’s showdown with Koobus, the film switches back to the 
‘documentary’ style with interviews of Wikus’s ex-colleagues and his wife. There are 
three points of interest to me here. Two of these points, are of course, the moments 
when the respective forms are used. The third point of interest is the in-between state, 
when both forms seem to merge into each other or switch between each other without 
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cueing the audience for the shift. Before these interesting ‘in-between’ moments are 
examined, I will start with an analysis of the use of the non-fictional film aesthetics in 
District 9.  
 In theory, between a documentary or news report and a narrative fictional film, 
one would expect the audience to trust the documentary or news report to produce a 
more factually accurate and objective report of an event than a narrative fictional film. 
This is the traditional view of the respective genres that stems from their differing 
histories and the drives behind them. Cowie writes, in “The Spectacle of Actuality”, 
that the documentary involves two desires. One of these is “a desire for reality held 
and reviewable for analysis as a world of materiality available to scientific and 
rational knowledge, a world of evidence confirmed through observation and logical 
interpretation” (Cowie 19). This is important for the study of District 9 because in this 
film, this view is deliberately undermined so the viewer is cued to distrust the 
narrative the most when it is told using the news or documentary aesthetics, and to 
trust the ‘camera’ more when the film uses cinematic features of the narrative film. 
For example, though the news reports on the serving of eviction notices to the aliens 
resemble a ‘real’ news report with its use of a shaky handheld-camera and headlines 
edited onto the screen, the content of the news causes the audience to distrust the 
reports immediately. Not only are the aliens forced to sign their acceptance of the 
eviction notices through lies, cajoling and threats, any resistance is also met with 
physical violence. The brutality of the humans towards the aliens suggests that what 
the humans say on screen cannot be trusted and that the aesthetics of documentaries 
and news reports can be used to stimulate ‘authenticity’ and ‘factuality’. This idea is 
further underlined by a particular instance in the film when Wikus, on the run from 
the MNU sees a news report that claims his mutation is the direct result of him having 
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sexual intercourse with alien prostitutes. The audience is clearly aware that this is not 
true in the diegetic world of the film, and Wikus expresses outrage at the falsity of the 
report. However, because this report is presented as news, his ex-colleagues and even 
his wife, who is potentially his biggest supporter, accept it as ‘real’ and trust it over 
Wikus’s own claims. This is because the report on the television is framed as ‘news’, 
and the basic assumption drawn is that ‘news’ is factual, objective, and thus ‘real’. In 
contrast, Wikus’s claims are assumed to be subjective, driven by personal interest and 
thus ‘not real’. This instant in the film perhaps underscores the discourse of film 
aesthetics and film form the most explicitly. The camera, the form of the report we 
see, and the medium through which we receive the report, strongly influences 
perceptions of the ‘authenticity’ of the report.  
When the form of the film switches to that of a narrative fictional film 
however, interestingly enough, even though it is still ‘film’, the audience is cued to 
trust its content more, especially with regards to Wikus’s story. This is largely 
because the narrative film appears to deliver what the documentary film cannot. 
Towards the end of the film, the documentary aesthetic takes the form of several 
interviews with Wikus’s ex-colleagues and his wife. In these interviews, they 
speculate about Wikus’s fate, but admit that they have no idea what had truly 
happened. In contrast, at the very end of the film, the film switches back to an 
omniscient camera which shows Wikus as an alien making a memento for his wife. 
What the documentary cannot show, the narrative film can, because the narrative film, 
in this film especially, assumes an omniscient view that allows it to follow Wikus on 
his personal journey from human to alien. If District 9 is the story of a human who 
learns, through becoming an alien, what it means to be human then it is a story, this 
film suggests, best told by the narrative film. Of course, this only serves to highlight 
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the failure of the documentary or news report even more. The purpose of news reports 
is, supposedly, to inform others of a factual event in an objective way. However, the 
fact that the fictional film aesthetics must be brought in to tell Wikus’s story shows 
that no camera is ever fully objective and able to report all the facts and truths of an 
event but a ‘fictional’ one. Hence, by deliberately inverting the traditional views of 
the various genres, the film demonstrates the destabilising effect of ‘modern 
technology’ on the body.  
Having said that, the trustworthiness of both filmic forms is called into 
question when the ‘second desire of the documentary’ that Cowie mentions is brought 
into the equation. For Cowie, the documentary does not only wish to capture and 
reveal the material world in an objective and scientific way; it also desires the “real 
not as knowledge but as image, as spectacle” (19). For example, Cowie discusses the 
medical documentary War Neuroses and how the film offers the visual pleasure of 
seeing “images of the grotesque contortions produced on the bodies of the soldiers” 
(21). While these images serve as a medical catalogue of the men’s symptoms, Cowie 
also notes that it constitutes a “filmic discourse that represents to us as spectators the 
disturbed and disrupted minds of the soldiers” (21). Turning the body into an image, a 
grotesque spectacle, is thus needed to drive the narrative of the soldiers suffering from 
war trauma. John Taylor, in the introduction of Body Horror mentions similar issues. 
Though Taylor insists that a proper recording of all sorts of images, including those of 
the body deformed, injured and mutilated, is necessary to “make a difference to 
perceptions of history and obligation by recording and providing evidence within the 
overall, complex structure of news” (5), he nonetheless admits that the news industry 
as a whole “always remains open to censure for sensationalism in both story lines and 
some kinds of intrusive photography” (4). He also admits that readers or viewers of 
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the news can partake in a pleasurable voyeurism where they take part in an “intrusive, 
secret gawking with dubious intent” (5-6).  
Certainly this is evident in the segments of District 9 that are filmed as news 
reports or documentaries. There is a desire to uncover the ‘truth’ behind the events in 
the film, such as the mystifying presence of the mother ship. However, at the same 
time, there is also that voyeuristic desire to see. For example, the camera team that 
follows Wikus as he evicts the aliens from their homes seeks to penetrate the slums 
the aliens live in and to reveal them on camera surrendering to the humans. At the 
same time, the portions of District 9 that draw on the features of the narrative film 
also do the same thing, if anything, in much greater depth than the documentary or 
news report style. As mentioned earlier, the documentary fails to reveal the ‘truth’ 
behind the events of District 9, whether about what happened on the mother ship that 
almost resulted in the deaths of the aliens on board or about what happened to Wikus 
in the end of the film. This, however, comes with the thwarting of the desire to see. 
For example, a lot of the ‘news’ footage was shot from a helicopter in the sky, with 
the result being the reduction of the objects on the ground to miniscule, hardly visible 
images. In contrast, the portions of the film that use the omniscient fictional-film 
camera, precisely because it reveals so much more of Wikus’s story, fetishizes his 
body more. Many of the close-up shots of his bodily mutations, such as his arm and 
his eye, appear primarily during these portions of the film. It is the same for the 
scenes featuring the agitation, humiliation and terror Wikus’s faces, such as when the 
camera takes a close-up shot of him forced to eat cat food like the aliens. The ideas 
that Cowie and Taylor raise can be applied equally to the documentary, the news 
report and the fictional film. All these film forms are guilty of turning the body into a 
spectacle to be consumed.   
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Of even greater interest to me is the point when the aesthetics seem to 
condense together. Though the film uses the news report, documentary and fictional 
narrative film styles, there are also portions of the film where it is unclear which film 
form is being used. One example is the scene where Wikus is driving a vehicle while 
he flees from the MNU building. The content of the narrative, where he is a fugitive 
fleeing from the MNU, indicates to the audience that this is the portion of the film that 
is captured using the omniscient fictional-narrative camera since the documenting 
camera cannot logically be present there. Yet, the cinematography of that scene seems 
somewhat closer to that of a documentary than a fictional narrative film. Firstly, the 
camera is situated in the backseat of the car, so it captures the back of Wikus’s head 
instead of his face. Secondly, the camera is shaky, clearly drawing the audience’s 
attention to the fact that there is someone sitting in the backseat, holding a handheld 
camera and filming Wikus. Thirdly, the lighting in this particular scene is a very 
bright, harsh white light that resulted in a slight overexposure of the film. 
Significantly, the source of the lighting seems to be in the backseat of the car. The 
way the presence of the filmmakers is highlighted is quite contrary to the typical 
fictional narrative film which tends to use invisible editing to hide the presence of the 
filmmakers.  
Rieder, though he does not examine these odd moments in the film, notes that 
the use of the quasi-documentary and the adventure tropes in District 9 “strikes a 
bargain between its contradictory generic impulses, by which the adventure elements 
procure the film’s access to mass distribution, allowing the documentary elements a 
hearing they would not otherwise obtain” (50). In other words, according to Rieder, 
the adventure elements, the fictional narrative aesthetics that frame Wikus’s bodily 
mutations and horror, are only there to allow the ‘real’ topic of racial discrimination 
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and tensions in South Africa to be aired publicly. That the film form switches back 
and forth, and even blends together, suggests that we are to see past the film form and 
take note of the ‘real’ political and ideological issues the film raises instead. Even the 
way the film ends with the vindication of Wikus, the affection his ex-colleagues 
express for him, and his wife’s declaration of her never-ending love in him seems to 
draw attention away from any focus on the cinematic form and back to these ‘real’ 
human issues of family, race and justice.  
However, is that necessarily a good thing? By drawing attention away from 
Wikus’s mutated body and refocusing it on his wife’s love for him, the film bypasses 
the discourse on the body. Instead, the film seems to suggest that any anxiety over the 
instability of the actual body can be dismissed because ‘real’, if intangible, human 
qualities like ‘love’ remain constant. Furthermore, if the camera, whether narrative or 
documentary, is complicit in the fetishization of the mutated body and the framing of 
the discourse of the body (part of which is about race) then disregarding the role 
media technology plays in it means disregarding the medium through which 
consumers of these media view the body. Instead, there seems to be an assumption 
that the consumer is perfectly capable of seeing past the framing of the discourse and 
recognising that politically-correct values such as familial love, romantic love, 
championing the marginalised races and self-sacrifice are to be taken as acceptable 
values. In short, by narrowing the focus of the film down to these values, the film 
effectively ignores any anxiety over the instability of the body or the complicity of 





Chapter Four: History and Memory in Inception (2010) and Source Code (2011) 
When it comes to the framing of the human identity by media and the 
instability of identity, one can hardly avoid talking about that which defines who one 
is: memory and history. Like the body, these two concepts have long been common 
themes in the discourse of the humanities, social sciences and film. Melissa Clarke, 
for example, in “The Space-Time Image”, applies Bergson’s and Deleuze’s theories 
of memory and the past to Christopher Nolan’s Memento, a film about a man who has 
lost the ability to form new memories. The only thing he remembers is that he needs 
to look for the man who killed his wife. Through his journey, the film illustrates how 
the inability to remember the past has a lasting and largely negative impact on the 
actions of the present. By using Bergson’s and Deleuze’s theories, Clarke 
demonstrates the complex relationship between memory, the past and the present. For 
example, she notes that “the way to access these levels of past from the present is 
through memory” (171). Furthermore, “pasts can be accessed by memory and become 
actual, thus influencing the present” (Clarke 171). In other words, though the past is 
virtual, it can be actualised by memory (Clarke 171). Memory is thus necessary to 
connect the past to the present, and it is this connection with the past that allows the 
individual and society to “interpret or give meaning to (or to find truth and falsity in) 
the present” (Clarke 179). Memento thus illustrates how the supreme fragility of 
memory leads to a disconnection between the past and the present, and makes the 
‘truth’ of the present uncertain.  
This relationship between past, present and memory becomes even more 
complicated when modern technology is introduced to the equation. In “When Analog 
Cinema Becomes Digital Memory”, David Tafler recognises, like Clarke does in the 
article above, that “Memory exists ontologically as malleable raw material” (187). 
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Further discussing the impact of new digital technologies on memory and history, 
Tafler notes that technology has become largely inseparable from memory, as it is 
what stimulates memory and mediates the “social experience and the social, political 
implications of the captured image” (181). This is a concept that has gained a lot of 
recognition in the production of film and the arts. One excellent example is the works 
of Canadian artist Janet Cardiff, as described by Tina Hanssen in “The Whispering 
Voice”. In this article, Hanssen describes how Cardiff uses ‘old technologies’ like the 
sounds of vinyl records, antique loudspeakers and dialogue from old movies to 
“prompt in the visitor a unique chain of associational responses and imagery” (40). 
Through an analysis of Cardiff’s work, Hanssen thus demonstrates how Cardiff 
illustrates the extent to which our memories of the past are largely shaped and 
mediated by media technology, as the sounds of these ‘technologies’ have a very 
important role in the process of reconstructing memories (41).  
This has many implications for the way individuals and society relate to the 
past, the present and memory. In the introduction to Save As… Digital Memories, the 
authors name some of the common themes in the discourse on modern technology and 
memory. Firstly, one of the impacts of media or digital technology on memory is what 
the authors refer to as the “memory boom” (Garde-Hansen 3). This took the form of 
news and documentary programmes relentlessly screened on television, resulting in 
the television as “a shaper of remembering and forgetting” (Garde-Hansen et al. 3). 
Digital technology, an example of ‘new’ media made prominent at the turn of the 
twenty-first century, changed the relationship between technology and memory even 
more (Garde-Hansen et al. 4). They seemed to allow for the limitless storage of 
memory in the forms of online memorials, digital archives and online museums, to 
name a few examples (Garde-Hansen et al. 4). On the one hand, this has allowed for 
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the deferral of information loss and given us the possibility of infinitely accumulating 
memories on machines (Garde-Hansen et al. 5). On the other hand, this accumulation 
has resulted in an information overload on machines that “do not seem substantial 
enough and lasting” (Garde-Hansen et al. 5). Furthermore, there is also the 
implication that by using machines as prosthetics for the human memory, the capacity 
of the human to remember in unique and imaginative ways is perceived to have been 
diminished (Garde-Hansen et al. 5).   
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly for the purposes of my thesis, there is 
recognition by the authors of the changing relationship between what is considered 
‘public’ memory and ‘personal’ memory (3). ‘Social network memory’ appears to 
have become a new hybrid form of public and private memory (Garde-Hansen et al. 
6) because digitised memory has become “open to immediate and continual 
reshaping” by those who are not the author of these online memories (Garde-Hansen 
et al. 6). In other words, the memories of the past that shapes the self, the individual, 
have become open to manipulation or (re)interpretation by others. If the validity of 
memory is called into question by the subjectivity of the individual and how the 
individual interprets these memories, modern technologies further complicate the 
equation by allowing the participation of the various subjectivities of a whole 
community in the (re)formation of an individual’s memories. The value of memory in 
the “seeming flux and satiation of digital content in the contemporary era” (Garde-
Hansen et al. 7) is thus called into question.         
This complex relationship between modern technology and memory, the past 
and present, can be seen quite clearly in the two films, Inception (2010) and Source 
Code (2011). Both films are similar in that they engage with the possibility of using 
modern technology, linked ostensibly to digital technologies, to alter memories or to 
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change events that happened in the past. However, they also seem to take opposing 
views on the matter, with Inception apparently proposing a rather more critical 
perspective of modern technology while Source Code seemingly taking a rather more 
positive outlook on the issue. In the following, I examine first Inception then Source 
Code to discuss how the films engage with the questions, concerns and possibilities of 
digital technology altering a person’s thoughts or past, which is often perceived to be 
unchangeable. Through a close analysis of the portrayal of inception and dream-
sharing in Inception, and the use of the Source Code in Source Code, I’ll show how 
both films, though appearing to take opposite views on the issue, express the tensions 
between a utopian fantasy of modern digital/media technology as a benign force that 
liberates the body from the past and a dystopian fantasy of modern digital/media 
technology as a malign force that allows the pasts and memories of individuals to be 
altered by others for their own purposes. An anxiety is thus raised regarding the 
possible pitfalls in the development and application of such technologies. However, I 
argue that ultimately, all the questions raised and the anxieties evoked are glossed 
over and largely ignored. Instead, the films side-step the entire issue by refocusing the 
narrative on traditionally accepted, ‘real’ emotions of familial love and romantic love, 
thus re-grounding the malleability of memories and histories in the perceived ‘reality’ 
of the human.    
Before going properly into the films and examining the issue at hand, it is 
important to first make a note of the prominence of the themes of memory and 
modern technology in Science Fiction films and their relevance to these two films, 
both of which are from that genre. Science Fiction films have long dealt with the ideas 
raised by the critics above. In “Rewind, Remix, Rewrite”, Sidney Matrix examines 
digital and virtual memory in cyberpunk cinema. Agreeing with Alison Landsberg 
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who argues that science fiction films attempt to “theorize the political and 
philosophical ramifications of memory in an age of mass culture (Matrix 61), Matrix 
examines the “operation of selected discourses of technologically-enhanced prosthetic 
memory work” in films such as Minority Report, The Final Cut and Vanilla Sky (61).  
One of the key points Matrix raises has to do with the different attitudes the 
various films take when engaging with the issue of prosthetic memory. First, Matrix 
notes that the “cyberpunk genre in film and literature is largely dystopic and reflects 
fin de siècle apprehension about the ramifications of computer technology on the 
human condition” (61-62). In many ways, such stories can be “viewed as cautionary 
fables concerning our over-reliance on digital technology” (62). The film, Final Cut, 
is used to prove this point, as it examines how the extensive editing of the individual’s 
memory upon their death so their families can view their memories with nostalgia 
instead of unease is cause for ethical concern (Matrix 68). As the anti-ZOE protestors 
in the film argue, the invisible implants that record the memories of the individuals 
create a culture of techno-surveillance and self-censorship, resulting in individuals 
acting as if they were always being monitored by a camera (Matrix 67). The 
mediation of memory through technology, specifically media technology, is thus put 
into question. However, at the same time, Matrix also notes that despite the overt 
criticism of modern technology, the films still “deliver a spectacular machine 
aesthetic, wherein computers… and all things high-tech are fetishized as powerful and 
beautiful objects” (62). Furthermore, many of these films also feature “powerful 
computer technologies, databases and miniature personal prosthetic memory gadgets 
that… operate to extend human neural function and claim to improve the quality of 
human life” (Matrix 61). In short, Matrix argues that a paradox exists in the genre 
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whereby it has “one foot in a science fiction utopia, steeped in technogear lust, and 
the other firmly planted on the terrain of social criticism” (62).  
i) Inception 
Certainly this tension can be seen in the film Inception (2010). Inception is set 
in a world where trained professionals can use technology to ‘extract’ memories or 
implant ideas (inception) in a person’s mind by accessing his or her dreams. Dom 
Cobb is hired by Saito, a cunning businessman to implant an idea into Robert Fisher 
Jr’s head. As the company Fisher is set to inherit from his dying father is Saito’s main 
business rival, he wants Cobb to incept Fisher’s mind and convince him to break up 
his father’s economic empire. Cobb accepts the job when Saito tells him he can get 
the charges against Cobb for murdering his wife dropped and allow him to return to 
America where his children are. Hence, Cobb forms a team to assist him. They come 
up with an elaborate plan that requires the creation of multiple levels of dreams. The 
mission however, is complicated by the guilt Cobb feels over the death of his wife, 
which he had caused by implanting in her the idea that the ‘real’ world is only a 
dream and she had to die to get out of it. This guilt manifests itself in a ‘virtual’ 
version of his wife, who thwarts his plans continuously throughout the movie. 
Eventually, though Saito dies in the dream and sinks into limbo, the team manage to 
succeed in their mission. Cobb goes into limbo seeking Saito and appears to 
successfully bring him back to reality. To complicate the plot, at the end when Cobb 
meets his children, the film creates ambiguity over whether he has made it back to 
reality or not, by refusing to allow the audience to see if the brass top he spins (a 
totem which indicates whether he is in the ‘real’ world or not depending on whether it 
falls after being spun) drops.  
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As can be seen, in Inception, the integrity of the individual’s memory is put at 
risk by the power of modern technology to manipulate and alter it. Since ‘modern 
technology’ is that which is implicated in the destabilising of ‘reality’ then this 
dream-sharing technology which fragments the perceived wholeness of memory 
certainly fits under that category. Specifically, it is digital film technology that is 
implicated in the mediatisation of memory. Though the film does not refer to the 
technology used to enter dreams as film or digital technology, it definitely implies it. 
In “The Lost Unconscious”, Mark Fisher notes that Inception’s dream-sharing 
technology resembles the Internet in that it was “a military invention turned into a 
commercial application” (39). One might even say that the dream-sharing invention 
resembles a social networking site, where other people can access the virtual space 
(i.e. memory or a social networking personal site) of another person. Furthermore, 
Mark Fisher notes that the prolonged action sequences in Inception seem to be there 
to “justify the clichés of action cinema – such as the ludicrous amount of things that 
characters can do in the time that it takes for a van to fall from a bridge into a river” 
(40). Mark Fisher also quotes blogger Carl Neville who observes that each level of 
dream that the team enters is basically a different type of action movie, moving from 
an action-thriller film in level one, to a cyberpunk-type film (like The Matrix) in level 
two and a seventies Bond film in level three (40). Furthermore, the landscaping of the 
dreams essentially resembles the creation of films, the most prominent example being 
when Ariadne causes the Parisian city space to fold upon herself and Cobb like a 
“CGI engineer” instead of a dreamer (Fisher 40). Based on these, I posit that the 
technology implicated in Inception is digital film technology.    
This particular form of technology is thus implicated in the endangering of 
personal or individual memory as it allows other people to alter, manipulate, or even 
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insert dreams, memories and ideas into the individual’s head. This danger could be 
referred to as ‘exposure’ (Hoskins 28). In “The Mediatisation of Memory”, Andrew 
Hoskins argues that one of the ways digital media has impacted the way we think 
about memory is through the way it connects the personal and the collective (28). For 
example, the formation and contestation of memories and the self-reflexive ways in 
which groups and individuals assemble and remove them becomes more public 
(Hoskins 28). One negative impact of this is the “public presentation and 
dissemination of all things past, private or otherwise… voluntary or involuntary and 
planned or accidental” (Hoskins 28). Unquestionably in Inception, the memories and 
thoughts within the individuals’ minds are no longer solely their own. This public 
sharing of the dream-space is not necessarily a positive or ethical one either. Fisher’s 
private grief over his father’s death, his pain and guilt over his father’s 
disappointment in him, is used by Cobb and Saito to implant the idea in his head that 
he should break up his father’s economic empire because that is what his father would 
want him to do. The goal behind this, though it incidentally makes Fisher feel better 
about his relationship with his father, is ultimately economic. Fisher’s private memory 
is altered to change the way he perceives his ‘past’ with his father, and through this, 
Saito and Cobb successfully trick him into undoing the economic empire his father 
had worked so hard to build.  
A second negative impact is the uncertainty of reality. In the same article, 
Hoskins asks, in response to his observation about the increasing exposure of different 
kinds of histories through digital media, “How can we adequately comprehend the 
new ‘softness’ of our media-memoryscape subject to the rapid and deeply penetrative 
personal, social, cultural and political changes?” (29). Inception asks the same 
question. If ideas can be implanted, if there are so many levels of ‘dreams’ (the 
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virtual) that simulate ‘reality’, is it possible for the individual to know if his memories 
are intact, or whether what he is experiencing is truly reality? The circumstances 
leading to Mal’s death is an excellent example of this. Mal and Cobb have created a 
world within a dream and lived there for several years. However, while they are in 
that dream, Mal starts to believe that the dream is ‘reality’. In an attempt to take her 
out of the dream, Cobb implants in Mal the idea that it is not reality. However, after 
they get out of the dream, Mal continues to believe that ‘reality’ is not ‘reality’, and 
that they had to die in order to return to ‘reality’. Thus, she writes a letter to their 
lawyer claiming that Cobb threatened her life and commits suicide in order to 
persuade Cobb to die with her. Her death is thus the consequence of two things. First, 
it is the ability of the ‘virtual’ to simulate the ‘real’ to the extent that they are 
indistinguishable from each other. Second, it is the inability to tell the ‘virtual’ from 
the ‘real’ because the individual’s memories have been altered by an outside force. 
The ‘softness’ of memory thus endangers the stability of ‘reality.     
Interestingly enough, despite all these anxieties that are raised by the film, the 
audience is not necessarily cued to disapprove of these technologies. There are a 
number of reasons for this. The first reason is that the protagonists of the film (the 
‘heroes’) are not the victims of these technologies but the extractors. If every level of 
the dream is like an action movie then the different team members play the action 
hero in the various levels. In level one, Yusuf goes through an exciting car chase 
scene where he must escape the faceless, virtual defenders of Fisher’s mind, who try 
to ruin their extraction. In level two, Arthur ingeniously uses explosives to allow for a 
free-fall in a hotel with zero gravity in order to save his team and bring them back to 
dream level one. In level three, there is an exciting chase scene through the snow and 
into a heavily guarded army fortress in which Eames sets up explosives to engineer 
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the ‘kick’ that will bring them back to dream level two. Then in ‘limbo’, where Mal 
resides, the ‘kick’ set off in level three manifests as a scene from apocalyptic movies 
like The Day After Tomorrow, with the tall buildings in Cobb’s dream being ripped 
apart by a massive storm. Furthermore, the members of the extracting team are not 
portrayed as bad people. Cobb, for example, despite the cold and merciless way he 
uses Fisher’s strained relationship with his father to manipulate him, is generally 
portrayed as a loving father whose main wish is to be able to see his children again. 
Even Saito, the ‘evil’ capitalist, turns out to be fairly human, vulnerable to the kind of 
uncertainty over ‘reality’ that Mal faces. Moreover, he keeps his promise to help 
Cobb return to America where he can meet his children, thus proving that he is, at the 
very least, a man of his word. In short, despite the dubious ethicality of what they are 
doing, the film does not cue the audience to judge the extractors and the technologies 
they wield.  
The second reason why this technology of dream-sharing or the extraction of 
memories is not necessarily portrayed in a negative light is due to the wondrous 
spectacle of the dreamscapes they manipulate. In “The Virtuality of Time”, Anneke 
Smelik discusses the “frenzy of the spectacle” in Science Fiction films (57). Smelik 
notes firstly that the Science Fiction film is well known for its spectacular special 
effects (57). In films that deal with memory and modern technology, often, memories 
are “registered in an audiovisual medium, as if the personal experiences had been 
recorded with a camera” (Smelik 57).  Memories are, by nature, virtual thus “films 
externalize and materialize memories by mediating them through technology” 
(Smelik 58). This fulfils two fantasies about memory. The first is the “fantasy of 
registering and projecting the internal, personal memory of a character outwards, thus 
collapsing inside and outside, internal and external space” (Smelik 58). The second is 
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the “fantasy of reliving the past – of making the past present” (Smelik 58). Certainly, 
Inception engages with these concepts. When Fisher finally meets his dying father 
within his dream, he gets to relive that moment of grief when he had been by his 
father’s side as he died in the ‘real’ world, and to reconcile his strained relationship 
with his father through the discovery of an object of sentimental value, a pinwheel. 
Even if the memory is falsified, even if it is staged so Fisher will break up his father’s 
empire, it is still a very touching scene where Fisher thinks he has gained the parental 
love and approval he had so desperately yearned for.  
Furthermore, though Smelik does not touch much on this concept, her use of 
the word ‘spectacle’ is very important, especially in the case of Inception. The 
dreamscapes created by the extractors are not just projections of a memory; they are 
visually stunning images. For example, when Ariadne experiments with Cobb’s 
dream by bending the streets of Paris, she creates a fantastical, spectacular image of 
the entire city folding in on itself. The scene where Arthur floats through a hotel with 
zero gravity or the scene in Yusuf’s dream where a freight train miraculously thunders 
down a busy street in the city are other excellent examples of this. Dreams and 
memories, by virtue of being virtual, are malleable and there is a joy that can be found 
in reshaping the virtual. Images that cannot be seen in ‘real’ life can be created in the 
‘virtual’. Things that cannot happen in ‘actual’ life can happen in the ‘virtual’. The 
‘virtual’ becomes more exciting than the ‘actual’, and the film recognises this, as seen 
when Cobb tells Arthur that Ariadne, having experienced the power and thrill of 
entering dreams, will not be able to avoid coming back for more as the ‘actual’ will 
become too boring for her (Inception). 
As can be seen from the discussion so far, the technology of dream-sharing, 
the malleability of memory and the manipulation of the individual’s memory has been 
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presented in quite a complex way in Inception. The technology, so closely associated 
with digital film technology, is seen as a double-edged sword. It can manipulate one’s 
memories and implant ideas in one’s head, but it can also provide an opportunity for 
catharsis and reconciliation with the past. However, having said that, the film, despite 
the way it raises these complex questions about modern technology and memory, 
ultimately sidesteps any anxieties raised by these questions, by refocusing the film’s 
narrative back to politically-correct, somewhat clichéd ideas of familial and romantic 
love.               
At the end, the film rejects the validity of dreams, of the virtual, through 
Cobb’s rejection of the ‘virtual’ Mal in his subconscious. When Cobb finally enters 
limbo and confronts the ‘virtual’ Mal, she questions him on his ability to tell what 
‘reality’ is. Cobb’s reply is that the ‘Mal’ he sees now is not ‘real’, that she can, in no 
way, match up to the ‘real’ Mal who had killed herself. As she is ‘virtual’, she does 
not have all the perfections and inadequacies of the real ‘Mal’, and Cobb thereby 
concludes there is no way he can recreate the ‘real Mal’ in his mind fully. By doing 
this, Cobb suggests firstly that the ‘virtual’ is not a good substitute for the ‘real’, and 
thus can never replace the ‘real’. Secondly, Cobb’s statement implies that it is, 
ultimately, still possible to tell the difference between the ‘real’ and the ‘virtual’, that 
the ‘real’ is still knowable and recognisable, even in the age of a technology that can 
manipulate the ‘virtual’ to the extent that it is almost indistinguishable from the ‘real’. 
This idea is further emphasised by the use of ‘totems’, which are ‘actual’ objects that 
the extractors use to check if they are still in a dream or if they had returned 
successfully to ‘reality’. The fact that there can be something ‘actual’ that informs the 
extractors of the status of the ‘reality’ around them suggests that the ‘real’ is still 
knowable as long as one knows how to look out for it.  
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What is ‘real’ and knowable is then grounded in the intangible qualities of the 
human being. When Cobb meets his children in the end, the audience is left 
wondering whether he had successfully left limbo or not. However, the film also 
seems to suggest that it does not matter if the children he meets are his ‘actual’ 
children. As Christopher Nolan, the director said in an interview, “The most important 
emotional thing about the top spinning at the end is that Cobb is not looking at it. He 
doesn’t care.” (Fisher 38-39). What the film’s ending strives to portray is not whether 
the ‘virtual’ can replace ‘reality’ or any other potentially anxiety-causing question. 
What the film’s ending tries to portray is the “emotional” (Fisher 38) part of it, the 
familial love that Cobb feels for his children, which overwhelms his desire to know 
whether he is still in a dream. The family unit is privileged above all other questions 
about ‘virtuality’, and is thus used to sidestep these questions. However, this refocus 
onto familial love is hardly a satisfactory ending. As Mark Fisher notes, “this ending 
has more than a suggestion of wish-fulfillment fantasy about it” (38), so too I argue 
that the film attempts to cancel out any anxiety over the status of ‘reality and the 
threat to ‘real’ memory by modern technology, by privileging, in a very clichéd way, 
the family over everything else.      
ii) Source Code 
 Perhaps even more so than Inception, recent Science Fiction film Source Code 
(2011) expresses this wish-fulfilment fantasy of ‘real’ human emotions conquering 
the instability caused by the ‘virtual’. The film opens with Colter Stevens, a pilot, 
waking up on a train with a woman named Christina who calls him Sean. Eight 
minutes later, the train explodes and he wakes up inside a dark, dome-like structure. 
He learns from Captain Colleen Goodwin, whom he speaks to over an interface, that 
he is part of a military program which uses a technology called the Source Code to 
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access the last eight minutes of a person’s life in an alternate reality. The person 
whose consciousness Colter had entered is Sean Fentress, a passenger on a train that 
had been blown up by an unknown perpetrator. Colter’s mission is to use the last eight 
minutes of Sean’s life to find out who the perpetrator is, as the military believes that 
the perpetrator intends to plant another bomb in Chicago. However, Colter is told that 
he is incapable of changing history so he cannot save the passengers who are already 
dead. In an attempt to complete his mission, Colter enters the Source Code multiple 
times, re-enacting the death of Sean Fentress over and over again, with minute 
changes caused by his actions in the alternate realities. Eventually, Colter starts to fall 
in love with Christina. He also learns he (as Colter) supposedly died two months ago, 
and that his mutilated body was taken by the Air Force for the Source Code project. 
When Colter eventually completes his mission, against his wishes, Rutledge, the 
inventor of the Source Code, orders Goodwin to erase Colter’s memory so he can be 
reused for other Source Code-related missions. However, Goodwin disobeys Rutledge 
and allows Colter to pass away. Hence, Colter enters the Source Code for one last 
time, and kisses Christina at the very last second. Instead of dying however, Colter 
finds that he continues to live in Sean’s mind and now has a new existence in this 
alternate reality where the passengers of the train do not die.   
Like Inception, Source Code initially appears to present quite a complex 
attitude towards the role of modern technology in the mediatisation of memory. As 
opposed to Inception, the film starts off by presenting the Source Code as a piece of 
technology that can be harnessed for altruistic purposes. The most obvious example 
is, as Goodwin and Rutledge tell Colter, the ability to prevent future disasters by 
solving the crimes of the past. If Colter successfully uncovers the identity of the 
bomber, he can prevent the future bombing of downtown Chicago. That he 
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successfully does so reaffirms the value of the Source Code as technology that can 
save lives. However, the film also goes beyond that to show the positive impact that 
modern technology can have on history.  
In “Digital Memory, Moving Images”, LeMahieu celebrates the potential of 
digital memory to surpass traditional archive sources when it comes to storing 
historical data (82). One of the ways digital memory will change the relationship 
between the present and the past, LeMahieu argues is the way the “past will feel 
present in a way never before possible” (82). For LeMahieu, “Historical discourse 
will become increasingly an immersive, multi-sensory activity… relived in ways that 
traditional written narratives could never capture” (82). In short, digital memory 
allows for a narrowing of “the distinction between spectatorship and lived 
experience” (LeMahieu 83). This is precisely the concept that can be seen in Source 
Code when Colter enters the last eight minutes of Sean’s life. Instead of the past being 
a distant, inaccessible object, Colter gets to ‘live’ history as Sean for a brief period of 
time. He gets to experience everything Sean experiences, including his death. The 
past becomes so ‘present’ for Colter that every time he leaves the Source Code, he 
wakes up deeply shaken by the experience of dying so many times.  
LeMahieu further notes that nostalgia for the past is often grounded in 
physical spaces, and that recently, nostalgia “involves a yearning for the protected 
virtual spaces” (83). This is because, LeMahieu argues, “Unlike physical locations, 
these virtual spaces do not fade or change” (83). An inherent stability is granted to 
historical memories recorded by digital memory. This idea is certainly evident in 
Source Code. The reason Colter can repeat the last eight minutes of Sean’s life so 
many times is because that virtual memory trapped in the Source Code will never 
change. He thus has the luxury of repeatedly entering the Source Code to examine 
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details he had missed the last time. This ability to keep repeating history, granted by 
the stability of digital memory and virtual spaces, allows him to finally discover who 
the bomber is and save the lives of hundreds of people.  
Moreover, the film suggests more than an increasing connection between the 
past and the present. As the film progresses, we eventually learn that Colter in 
‘reality’ is, in fact, not much better than a dead man. At the end of the film, the 
audience is granted a glimpse of his ‘actual’ body, which has been irreversibly, 
severely damaged, and cannot possibly survive without any life support. Like in 
Avatar, modern technology in Source Code thus allows for the “freedom of liberating 
the mind from the prison of the body” (Tafler 198). By entering Sean’s consciousness, 
Colter is granted a new lease on life. Not only can he continue to function as a healthy 
human being, he finds love in Christina, and manages to save the lives that the 
bomber would have killed should he have succeeded in planting the bomb in 
downtown Chicago. This is emphasised by the ending of the film. After he disarms 
the bomb on the train, the train does not blow up and he discovers that he has changed 
history. He now has a new life as Sean Fentress. It is the technology of accessing the 
past, of accessing alternate realities, that gives Colter a chance to live again.  
Having said that, the film, like Inception, also expresses a certain degree of 
apprehension towards the use of such technologies. Though Source Code adopts a 
more positive view towards this modern technology than Inception does, anxiety over 
the use of such technology still seeps through. One such way this can be seen is in 
how the film obviously raises questions about the ethical use of such technologies. 
Firstly, the reason why Colter can use the Source Code to access other alternate 
realities is because he is caught in a limbo between life and death, just like the 
passengers he meets in the eight minutes are. His body is then appropriated by the 
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military, most likely without his consent as we learn he had supposedly been ‘killed’ 
two months earlier, for the purposes of experimentation. The film even suggests that 
Colter’s own family has no idea what had happened to him. This leaves him at the 
mercy of the scientists and military staff in charge of the Source Code project. For 
example, when Colter finds out that he is near death and that it is only his 
consciousness that has survived, he requests that he be allowed to die. However, upon 
the completion of his mission, Rutledge backs out on his promise and orders Goodwin 
to erase Colter’s memory so they can reuse him again in a separate Source Code 
mission. The only reason why Colter escapes this fate is because Goodwin chooses to 
fulfil the promise made to him. As the nature of this technology leaves the fate of 
those involved in the hands of the people who control the technology, the potentiality 
for misuse is born. Moreover, because Colter now exists only as a set of ‘data’ in a 
computer, a point emphasised when we see that his conversation with Goodwin 
appears as words on a computer screen instead of images on a screen, which is how 
Colter sees Goodwin, this leaves him vulnerable to manipulation. The separation of 
the human mind from the ‘actual’ body thus leaves his ‘virtual’ memories open to 
alteration by the military.  
Perhaps one of the most prominent complications seen in the film, one that is 
not adequately dealt with, is the takeover of Sean Fentress’s body by Colter. 
Throughout the entire film, whenever the audience sees Colter on screen, he appears 
as Colter (played by Jake Gyllenhaal). However, every time Colter glances in a mirror 
or a reflective surface, the reflection that he (and the audience) sees is of Sean 
Fentress (played by Frédérick De Grandpré). Hence, when Colter lives on in the new 
alternate reality, he is living in the ‘actual’ body of Sean Fentress. His relationship 
with Christina is thus continued in the identity of Sean. This is emphasised when at 
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the end of the film, Christina and Colter stand before a giant metallic globe, some 
form of decorative structure, and the audience sees in the reflection, Sean’s image 
(not Colter’s) speaking to Christina. The question arises then: what has happened to 
Sean’s consciousness now that Colter is in his body? The Source Code project had 
given the passengers of the train in this particular alternate reality a chance at life, but 
one of them, Sean, is still ‘dead’ in the sense that his consciousness no longer exists. 
Colter’s new life, signified by his call to Goodwin asking her to tell the ‘Colter’ in her 
care that “Everything will be alright” (Source Code), is based on the erasure of Sean’s 
consciousness, past and memory from that reality.  
Yet again, the film’s obvious disregard of such questions suggests a reluctance 
to deal with these issues and an attempt to sidestep the issue altogether. For example, 
though the threat to Colter’s memory is seen in the presence of Rutledge, the heartless 
scientist determined to prove the viability of the Source Code, it is quickly cancelled 
out by the compassion and humanity of Goodwin. This suggests that the technology is 
not the one that should be put into doubt; the ethics and morals of the people using it 
are. As long as the people using the technology are ‘good’, ‘human’ and ‘moral’, as 
Goodwin is, then the technology can be used for the altruistic purposes of saving 
lives. The ‘real’, ‘intangible’ value of ‘human’ kindness towards another human is 
thus emphasised. The implications of the potential of modern technology to alter 
memories and histories is put aside in favour of a conflict between the ‘kind and 
compassionate’ Goodwin and the ‘cruel and ambitious’ Rutledge, one in which the 
audience is obviously supposed to take Goodwin’s side. The wonder of these 
intangible human qualities becomes the ‘moral’ of the story.  
The same thing happens when the film engages (or rather, disengages) with 
the problematic erasure of Sean’s memories and consciousness by Colter. As I have 
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noted, the ethicality of Colter simply taking over Sean’s life is questionable. 
However, the film ends with the suggestion that this takeover is a positive thing as the 
film adopts Colter’s perspective, and thus forces the audience to do the same. With 
this, Colter can now continue to live as a free man with the woman that he loves, and 
that is what the film focuses on. This can certainly be seen in one particular scene 
towards the end of the film when Colter, after successfully disarming the bomb, 
thinks he is going to die. In that scene, at the very last second before his eight minutes 
runs out, Colter kisses Christina and time seems to stop. However, when the kiss ends, 
time continues flowing and Colter discovers that he has successfully altered the past, 
thus saving all the passengers in the train. The editing, with his kiss at the very last 
second, seems to suggest that it is his love for Christina that has conquered the 
‘unconquerable’, Time, and allowed him to alter history. Like Inception then, the 
ending of Source Code comes across rather like a “wish-fulfillment fantasy” (Fisher 
38). The implications of altering histories, the question of what had happened to 
Sean’s memories, are all put aside in favour of celebrating Colter’s newfound 
romance with Christina. 
Inception and Source Code are two films that deal with modern technology 
and memory or history, that initially seem to approach the issue from two opposing 
perspectives. However, I have showed that ultimately, both films do the same thing, 
which is to negate any anxiety about the potential of modern technology to alter 
histories and memories. Like Cloverfield and District 9, they do this by refocusing the 
attention of their respective narratives onto ‘intangible’ human qualities like love and 
compassion. Though Inception appears to take a critical approach to the ability of 
modern technology to alter memories, in the end, the film disregards the question of 
the ability of modern technology to alter memories and simulate ‘reality’ by 
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emphasising Cobb’s love for his children as that which overcomes all. Similarly, 
though Source Code presents a form of technology that can undo bad things that 
happened in the past if used by the ‘right’ people, it similarly dismisses all the 
implications of that form of technology by highlighting Colter’s love for Christina 
instead. The unstable nature of ‘memory’, the possibility of modern technology 
altering the ‘past’, is thus dismissed in favour of celebrating the ‘positive’ sides of 
humanity, ‘real’ human qualities that seem to be above the meddling and 
















Conclusion: The End of the Story? 
I started off this thesis with the purpose of examining the curious effect of 
modern technology on the status of ‘reality’, ‘authenticity’ or ‘truth’ in recent Science 
Fiction films. The premise for this study was that recent Science Fiction films, such as 
Cloverfield (2008) and Inception (2010) engage with the unstable nature of ‘reality’ in 
a way that is slightly different from earlier Science Fiction films like The Matrix 
(1999) or Alien (1979). This change expressed, I argued, is reflective of an alternate 
perception towards the impact of modern technology that is gaining prominence in 
popular culture. For the purposes of examining these films and the way they engage 
with discourse on ‘reality’ and modern technology, I selected four primary films to 
examine: Cloverfield (2008), District 9 (2009), Inception (2010) and Source Code 
(2011). These films were selected for two reasons. Firstly, they are very recent films 
on which little has been written. My thesis thus hopes to fill the gap in scholarship 
with regards to these films. Secondly, to reiterate a point made in the introduction of 
this thesis: these films are films which express a slightly different perspective on 
‘reality’ and modern technology than other Science Fiction films. On a very 
superficial level, they seem to express a rather blasé attitude towards modern 
technology in the way they play down the spectacle of modern technology in the films 
or make spectacles out of other things that are only indirectly related to modern 
technology, like dreams in Inception. The question is whether this attitude reflects an 
acceptance of modern technology and its various impacts on society. In other words, 
is there no longer an anxiety over the negative impacts of modern technology on 
perceptions of ‘reality’, ‘actuality’ and ‘virtuality’?  
Before doing analyses of the films chosen, I started out by providing a 
working definition for the terms ‘reality’, ‘actuality’, ‘virtuality’ and ‘modern 
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technology’. In essence, I define ‘reality’ as that which is somehow seen as ‘true’ or 
‘authentic’, ‘actuality’ as that which has a physical existence and ‘virtuality’ as that 
which does not have a physical existence. Through an analysis of the various critical 
theories written about the subject, I then concluded that the anxiety at hand was the 
increasing awareness of the instability of reality. Though modern technology cannot 
be blamed for the instability of the ‘real’, it has the discomforting side-effect of 
revealing this innate characteristic of the ‘real’. The anxiety over the effects of 
modern technology then is not so much the increasing ‘virtualisation’ of the world or 
the inability to tell the ‘image’ from the ‘actual’, but the sense that it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to deny that the ‘virtual’ can be as ‘real’ as the ‘actual’.  
Following that, the next three chapters dealt with the four films in question. In 
the first of these chapters, the use of the home video aesthetics in the film Cloverfied 
(2008) was examined. By contrasting it with previous horror films that use similar 
aesthetics, specifically The Blair Witch Project (1999), I showed how the former is 
markedly different from the latter in that it has no intention of using the home video 
aesthetics to ‘trick’ the audience into believing the events of the film really happened. 
If historically, the use of ‘documentary’ or ‘home video’ aesthetics was for the 
purposes of tricking the audience then Cloverfield evidently breaks from this trend. 
Rather, the film emphasises its constructed nature and invites, through the use of 
savvy Internet marketing, the viewer to ‘decode’ the events of the film by viewing 
both the film and the ‘clues’ dropped online. The potential of modern technology, of 
audio-visual media to simulate reality is thus covered up by the emphasis on the 
‘actuality’ and ‘reality’ of the production process, and the ever present ‘real’ existence 
of the filmmakers. Any anxiety that might be evoked by the use of the home video 
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aesthetic to simulate ‘reality’ is thus bypassed by the way the film highlights its own 
constructed nature. 
In the second chapter dedicated to a closer analysis of the chosen films, the 
body in District 9 (2009) is closely examined. More specifically, I examined how the 
body in District 9 is framed within various media conventions and discourses. By 
studying the way the film uses two distinct narrative styles - one simulating the 
aesthetics of a documentary and the other, the aesthetics of a conventional fictional, 
narrative film - I demonstrated how the film criticises the elevated status of the 
documentary as factual and objective, and thus complicit in the ideological framing of 
the body. However, despite the anxiety over modern technology and its ability to 
simulate reality that is present, I argue that the film nonetheless attempts to cancel out 
these anxieties by suggesting that intangible but real ‘human’ qualities such as 
romantic love, courage and self-sacrifice remain constant despite the mutability of the 
‘actual’ human body.  
Finally, in the third of these chapters, I examined the complex relationship 
between modern technology, memory and the past in Inception (2010) and Source 
Code (2011). First, I established that human memory and the past are increasingly 
mediated through modern technologies like documentaries and online databases. 
Next, by examining the technologies of inception and the Source Code in the 
respective movies, I demonstrated how both films express, in varying degrees, an 
anxiety over the potential of modern technology to alter memories or the past, and 
thus alter some perceived 'truth' about the past. However, as is the case in all the other 
films examined, the question of 'modern technology' is glossed over by an emphasis 
on 'human' emotions. Inception, for example, ends with the suggestion that it does not 
truly matter whether Cobb finds his 'actual' children; rather, it is his ‘real’ and 
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enduring love for his children that truly matters. As long as that emotion survives, his 
reunification with the children, virtual or not, can be considered a success. Similarly, 
in Source Code, the implications of a form of technology that can not only allow a 
person to access the past but to change it is entirely side-stepped by refocusing instead 
on the romantic relationship between Colter and Christina.  
Based on these, I can finally draw a conclusion regarding the questions raised. 
These films, despite their seeming acceptance of the increasingly commonness of 
'modern technology' and its assimilation into society, still express fear over the 
potential of 'modern technology' to alter the 'truth' or 'authenticity' of some object or 
subject. Instead, the films strive to refocus anxiety by displacing it onto something 
that is seen as irrefutably 'real': the human. For example, human emotions and 
relations, the romantic love between couples, the love of a parent for his child, the 
relationship between filmmaker, audience and film, or the love between comrades and 
friends. Even if modern technology can simulate the virtual, as is the case in 
Inception, it cannot simulate, alter or manipulate genuine ‘human’ characteristics.  
This logically suggests an interesting change in the relationship between 
'actual', 'virtual' and 'reality' in these films. If Science Fiction films like The Matrix 
express a fear of the ability of 'modern technology' to simulate the actual, which is 
linked to 'authenticity', these films are less concerned with the ‘actual’ than with the 
‘real’. Instead, the films acknowledge that the 'virtual' can be as 'real' as the 'actual'. 
Love, for example, is by no means 'actual'. It can be expressed in 'actual' ways, such 
as through the giving of gifts, but the emotion itself is 'virtual' in that it has no 
physical form. Yet, this ‘virtual’ emotion can still be ‘real’. Hence, even in an 
increasingly ‘virtual’ world, ‘reality’ can still exist. Interestingly enough, the films 
still refuse to acknowledge the ‘reality’ of that which is simulated by modern 
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technology. The 'virtual' things that are seen as 'real', the empathy between a man and 
an alien or the love between couples or family members, are all distinctly human, 
organic, and not related to modern technology. Even if the 'body' is 'alien', as is the 
case in District 9, the emotions of empathy, of courage and of a general compassion 
for others, are, arguably, very human emotions that the audience can connect with. 
Ultimately, 'reality' is still grounded in the human, and, following this logic, the 
human must remain for ‘reality’ to exist.  
At this point, one might expect a criticism of this struggle between humanism 
and post-humanism, and perhaps a gesture to the dying throes of an increasingly out-
dated humanism in the post-human world. However, I do not intend to take a side and 
to claim the superiority of one theoretical perspective over the other. As Neil 
Badmington states in "Theorizing Posthumanism", even the last vestiges of humanism 
require and deserve attention in the age of the post-human (15). Furthermore, 
Badmington claims that this act should not be read as regressive, conservative or 
reactionary (15). For Badmington, "To engage with humanism, to acknowledge its 
persistence, is not necessarily to support humanism" (15). In a similar vein, I claim 
that to examine this rather awkward struggle in the films to cling to humanism or the 
'human' is not necessarily to take a stand against humanism or the enduring image of 
the human. Rather, the purpose of doing so is simply to take note of the ways theories 
on the human have been changed and altered to fit into an increasingly post-human 
world.  
Having said that, the manner in which I have discussed the films’ tendency to 
refocus on the 'human' does contain some dissatisfaction with the way the films go 
about doing it. This dissatisfaction stems from the way the films raise intriguing 
questions about modern technology only to brush them all aside in favour of neat, 
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clichéd endings that evolve around human relationships, love and family. Even 
Cloverfield, the one film analysed that strives for an indisputable ‘tragic’ ending, ends 
significantly with the declaration of love between Rob and Beth. However, that sense 
of dissatisfaction in itself is perhaps significant in indicating the place of the 'human' 
in the post-human age. 
Certainly, the films demonstrate an anxiety over the disappearance of 
'authenticity', a part of which is an anxiety over the disappearance of the 'human'. 
Why this anxiety though? Badmington, in the same article hints at some reasons. In 
his analysis of a particular Times' cover, he notes that even though the 'Man' of the 
Year is, shockingly, a machine, a tiny anthropomorphic figure also features in the 
background of the cover (12-13). Badmington then questions why a 'human witness' 
needs remain if machines have taken over humanity (13). Perhaps, the fear then is 
precisely the disappearance of the 'witness' or of the possibility of bearing witness to 
the events of the world. For, as Cloverfield suggests, even if the video camera records 
Beth's and Rob's final end, can it truly be considered as bearing witness to their 
plight? If no one watches the video, will it then remain as nothing but a mere 
recording?  
I thus conclude that in the age of 'modern' technology, of a growing post-
human sensibility, perspectives and attitudes towards 'inanimate' objects, towards 
'modern' technology have started to change. Whether the effects of 'modern' 
technology are celebrated or condemned, or whether a plain ambivalence towards it is 
demonstrated, films, especially Science Fiction films, will strive to deal with these 
concepts and struggle, if incompletely, for a satisfactory conclusion that will bring 
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